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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over five years ago, the Institute of Medicine issued its report on 
medical errors entitled To Err Is Human.1  This report documented 
the fact that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die each year in 
 
 1 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. 
Kohn et al. eds., 1999). 
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hospitals due to medical mistakes.2  These figures are equal to the 
number of casualties that would occur if one jumbo jet crashed in 
this country every day for a whole year.3  Five years after the To Err Is 
Human report, the medical profession has made some progress in the 
reduction of medical errors, but this progress has been insufficient.4  
According to one expert, 
[s]tronger regulation has helped, as have some early improve-
ments in information technology and in workforce organization 
and training.  Error-reporting systems have had little impact, and 
scant progress has been made in improving accountability.  Five years af-
ter the [To Err Is Human] report’s publication, we appear to be at 
“the end of the beginning.”5 
The medical malpractice system is one of the major vehicles of 
accountability for medical errors.  Physicians, lawyers and politicians 
debate the merits of the medical malpractice system generally,6 but its 
overall impact on patient safety, both positive and negative, is over-
stated.7  Peer review systems are less discussed, but have more poten-
tial significance in improving quality of care.8  ‘Peer review’ refers to 
 
 2 Id. at 1. 
 3 Robert M. Wachter, The End of the Beginning: Patient Safety Five Years After ‘To Err 
Is Human,’ HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov. 30, 2004, at 534, http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
webexclusives/index.dtl?year=2004; see also Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Ad-
verse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 (1991) (noting that among 2,671,863 patients 
discharged from New York hospitals in 1984, there were 98,609 adverse events, 
27,179 of which involved negligence); Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse 
Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 377, 377 (1991) (stating that investigation of patients admitted into New 
York hospitals in 1984 revealed that 3.7 percent suffered injuries and twenty-eight 
percent of those injuries were due to negligence). 
 4 Wachter, supra note 3, at 535. 
 5 Id. at 534 (emphasis added). 
 6 See, e.g., id. at 540; HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND 
LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN 
NEW YORK (1990) [hereinafter HARVARD STUDY] (Harvard University study of the fea-
sibility of a statewide no-fault system for injuries from medical care pursuant to a 
contract with the Department of Health of the State of New York); MAXWELL J. 
MEHLMAN, THE HARVARD NO-FAULT PROJECT: A CRITIQUE i–iv, 58–59 (1989) (asserting 
that a no-fault system would decrease patient compensation, eliminate deterrence, 
dramatically increase costs, reduce physician morale and create a bureaucratic 
nightmare); see generally MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, SAYING “NO” TO NO-FAULT: WHAT THE 
HARVARD MALPRACTICE STUDY MEANS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM (1991) 
(pointing out bias and design flaws in the Harvard Malpractice Study).  See also infra 
notes 182–98 and accompanying text. 
 7 Wachter, supra note 3, at 540.  See generally HARVARD STUDY, supra note 6. 
 8 Wachter, supra note 3, at 540–41: 
     In contrast to malpractice . . . the lack of accountability for poor 
performance does harm patient safety. . . . [T]here are some bad doc-
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the evaluation of the performance of a physician by other physicians 
to ensure the quality of patient care given in an institution.9  In 1995, 
Congress determined that peer review held the promise of enhancing 
the quality of medical care through the deterrence of medical mal-
practice and the identification of incompetent physicians.10  However, 
individual institutions, such as hospitals,11 and professional associa-
tions, such as the American Medical Association and state licensing 
boards,12 have been struggling with how to implement systems of ac-
countability to deal with incompetent physicians, with little success.  
 
tors and nurses, and our system of accountability (at the level of indi-
vidual institutions, professional associations, and state licensing boards) 
does not know how to deal with them. . . . 
     . . . [W]e have made virtually no progress in tackling these excep-
tionally thorny questions in the past five years. 
 9 See SLEE’S HEALTHCARE TERMS 474 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter SLEE’S]. 
 10 See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1)–(3) (2000) (congressional findings acknowledging 
that peer review is a factor in the resolution of the national issue of medical malprac-
tice). 
 11 See Wachter, supra note 3, at 540–41.  See also John H. Colteaux, Note, Hospital 
Staff Privileges: The Need For Legislation, 17 STAN. L. REV. 900, 901–02 (1965): 
     The need for hospital professional discipline has developed primar-
ily because of the failure of other forms of restraint.  A state medical li-
cense is no assurance that a doctor can competently perform every 
procedure known at the time he obtains the state’s permission to prac-
tice.  Furthermore, although his license legally permits a physician to 
attempt the most sophisticated procedures then known or later devel-
oped, licensing boards do not conduct postlicensing competency 
checks. . . . Voluntary professional associations, . . . [such as the Ameri-
can Medical Association], attempt to influence practice by statements 
on proper standards and procedures and by the threat of expulsion.  
As a practical matter, however, their effectiveness is limited.  First, 
membership in professional associations is not required for practice, 
and nonmembers cannot be disciplined.  Second, these associations 
can effectively discipline members only after the fact and in the most 
flagrant cases of malpractice because a physician’s colleagues are 
loathe publicly to question his qualifications prior to his making a ma-
jor mistake, and even then fear of defamation actions may stifle criti-
cism.  Third, even where a member is expelled—which is rare—the ac-
tion has no legal effect and may have little practical effect on the 
doctor’s ability to practice as he sees fit. . . . 
     In short, the physician outside the hospital is largely responsible 
only to himself for the type of procedures he undertakes.  The hospi-
tals, however, can provide an effective restraint on unqualified medical 
and surgical practitioners. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 12 “At this point, confidence that medical licensure boards are capable of system-
atically identifying incompetent practitioners, and that board interventions can ad-
dress the problems caused by such practitioners, are [sic] probably misplaced.”  
Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look At Medi-
cal Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 336 (1993) (describing the results of a 
study analyzing complaints closed by the Ohio State Medical Board in 1990). 
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Thus, the potential that peer review holds to enhance the quality of 
patient care has yet to be fulfilled. 
One reason for this failure may be attributed to the standards 
which are being used to measure the competence of physicians in 
hospital peer review proceedings.13  Hospitals across the country are 
relying on a variety of extraordinarily vague standards as measures of 
clinical competence.14  These standards appear to fall into three basic 
categories: those which vest absolute discretion in the hospital to 
terminate the staff privileges of physicians for ‘the good of the hospi-
tal;’15 those which rely on customary care as practiced in the hospital 
or some broader medical community;16 and, those which import tort 
standard of care doctrines that equate a negligence inquiry with an 
incompetence evaluation.17 
The use of these standards has negative implications for all of 
the stakeholders in the peer review process: patients, hospitals and 
physicians.  Many of these vague standards bring with them a whole 
bag of rules and premises, both legal and evidentiary, that are inap-
propriate in the context of peer review.  Attempts to apply these legal 
and evidentiary doctrines may confuse and burden the peer review 
process, raising its attendant transaction costs to a prohibitive level.  
These doctrines also raise the level of outcome uncertainty.  In light 
of both the high level of cost and uncertainty, a hospital may be re-
luctant to initiate the peer review process, placing patient safety at 
risk.  In short, the application of these vague standard of care meas-
urements in peer review proceedings may be one of the reasons that, 
seven years after the To Err Is Human report, peer review has failed to 
meet expectations as a vehicle of accountability. 
When the hospital staff does engage in the formal peer review 
process, the validity of the process may be jeopardized by employing 
vague and ambiguous standard of care rules ex post facto.18  Employ-
ing these vague standard of care measurements runs directly contrary 
to rule of law principles grounded in due process/fundamental fair-
 
 13 The source for the information regarding the standards that are being relied 
upon by hospitals in peer review is a broad sampling of the reported cases dealing 
with the appeal of peer review decisions to the courts.  Thus, this Article is analogous 
to a case study.  Further empirical research which gathers data directly from the hos-
pitals themselves is necessary to confirm that this sample is an accurate reflection of 
the standards in use in all hospitals across the country. 
 14 See infra Part VI. 
 15 See infra Part VI.A. 
 16 See infra Part VI.B. 
 17 See infra Part VI.C. 
 18 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
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ness concerns.  The end result may be that a physician’s ability to 
practice medicine is unfairly impacted, without the compensating 
opportunity for any meaningful judicial review.  Finally, if the peer 
review participants are sued individually by a physician dissatisfied 
with a peer review hearing result based on due process concerns, all 
of these participants are at risk of losing the immunity normally pro-
vided by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”).19 
Numerous courts opine that there is no good solution to this 
vagueness problem.  They doubt whether the establishment of clear, 
objective criteria is possible.20  Over and above this issue, these courts 
express concern regarding the feasibility of making timely revision of 
objective criteria to reflect the rapid pace of scientific advance-
ments.21  This quick rate of obsolescence raises the specter that judg-
ments regarding physician competence could be based on bad data.  
Thus, standards based on objective criteria, while being less vague, 
may nevertheless be arbitrary.  In addition, although no court has 
pointed out this parallel, it could be argued that many of the same 
vague standards that are used in peer review have survived vagueness 
challenges in the context of medical malpractice litigation and medi-
cal licensure proceedings. 
Perhaps for these reasons, the vast majority of the case and statu-
tory law gives scant attention to peer review standards, instead focus-
ing considerable efforts on enforcing an extensive set of mechanical 
process protections in the attempt to protect due process.22  However, 
this list of process protections are all empty formalities if, after the 
proceedings are completed, the decision-makers can decide to take 
whatever actions their personal inclinations dictate.  This concern 
becomes evident when examining the differences between the deci-
sion-makers in peer review and the decision-makers in medical mal-
practice and medical licensure proceedings.23  The decision-makers in 
medical malpractice litigation and medical licensure hearings are 
judges, juries and administrative officials who are unlikely to have 
had prior dealings or involvement with the targeted physician.  They 
are disinterested third parties.  In contrast, peer review is generally 
handled entirely in-house.  It is highly likely that both the decision-
makers and the other participants in the process have had, or con-
tinue to have, personal and economic dealings with the targeted phy-
 
 19 See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra Parts III–IV. 
 23 See infra note 157. 
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sician.24  Moreover, peer review decision-makers may feel pressure to 
bow to the wishes of the executive committee (or other powerful 
members of the hospital staff) to terminate the targeted physician.  
While vagueness concerns are important in all of these proceedings, 
the risks to a fair process are greater in peer review, requiring much 
greater clarity in the standards used. 
This Article proposes a solution to the problems associated with 
the current use of vague standards in peer review.  This Article will 
examine the proposal that medical staffs switch from ad hoc judicial 
decision-making to rule-making.  This switch will allow medical staffs 
to abandon the troublesome practice of applying vague ‘standard of 
care’ measures ex post facto.  In its stead, express contractual termi-
nology could be adopted, such as ‘expectations of performance,’ 
which incorporates specifically chosen and uniquely tailored clinical 
practice guidelines (“CPGs”) directly into the medical staff by-laws.  
Describing the expectations of physician performance in express con-
tractual terms enables physicians to conform to appropriate institu-
tional norms ex ante, which, this Article argues, enhances patient 
safety.  In addition, providing physicians with clear notice of the con-
duct that could trigger the formal peer review process deters conduct 
that places patient safety at risk.  This choice also decreases the risk of 
caprice and discrimination and permits a more meaningful judicial 
review of hospital peer review actions.  This Article also proposes a 
mechanism to avoid CPG obsolescence to ensure that decisions are 
based on good outcomes data (evidence-based medicine), and not 
past practice (eminence-based medicine).  This proposed mechanism 
is similar to that which is currently being used by hospital Institu-
tional Review Boards to keep apace of scientific developments and 
avoid duplication of efforts, delays and expense. 
Adopting this strategy may also avoid many of the pitfalls that are 
attendant to the use of the current vague standards and could mini-
mize the temptation to import inappropriate and destructive legal 
and evidentiary doctrines into the peer review process.  This may re-
sult in a more equitable balancing of the public’s quality of care con-
cerns with the interests of the physician in a fair process of formal 
peer review.  This shift to contract principles could streamline the 
formal peer review process making a hospital less reluctant to engage 
in peer review, providing a greater assurance of patient confidential-
 
 24 See generally John D. Blum, Beyond the Bylaws: Hospital-Physician Relationships, 
Economics, and Conflicting Agendas, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 470–74 (2005) (explaining 
how credentialing includes economic considerations blurring the line between busi-
ness and quality judgments). 
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ity and enhancing the certainty of HCQIA protections for all involved 
in the process.  These clear expectations of performance meet rule of 
law principles as they provide clearly articulated standards that satisfy 
due process/fairness concerns.  Finally, a switch from ad hoc judicial 
decision-making to rule-making carries with it the benefits of allowing 
a conscious choice between competing social values inherent in our 
complex health care system. 
Part II of this Article provides a history of the oversight of the 
quality of care in hospitals.  Part III furnishes a brief summary of how 
the formal peer review process is conducted.  Part IV explains the 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act.  Part V outlines the current 
schism in the courts over the appropriateness of the standards cur-
rently being used to evaluate physician competence in peer review.  
Part VI describes the problems inherent in the various vague catego-
ries of standards currently being used to evaluate physician compe-
tence.  In Part VII, several potential solutions are evaluated.  While 
not a perfect short term solution, this Article concludes that, ulti-
mately, the use of CPGs to measure competency is a far superior ap-
proach in light of the myriad problems associated with the current 
system. 
II. HISTORY OF THE OVERSIGHT OF QUALITY OF CARE IN HOSPITALS 
Until the early 1900s, the vast majority of patient care was per-
formed in either the physician’s office or in the patient’s home.25  
Hospitals were considered to be charitable institutions which pro-
vided free care for the poor.26  Popular opinion at the time was that 
hospitals in general were so poorly run as to bring “discredit upon 
the medical profession.”27  Physicians avoided sending their patients 
to hospitals as “the hospital had no special advantages over the home, 
and the infections that periodically swept through hospital wards 
made physicians cautious about sending patients there.”28  Even com-
plicated surgeries were conducted “in the home, often in the 
 
 25 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government 
Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When is it Appropriate?, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 47, 50 (“Until the twentieth century, most health care was 
provided at home.”). 
 26 Id.; see also Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals’ Physician 
Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 599–604 (2000) (provid-
ing an excellent summary of the history of the hospital-physician relationship and 
the organization of medical staffs). 
 27 LOYAL DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE 
OF SURGEONS 63 (Am. Coll. of Surgeons 1973) (1960). 
 28 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 157 (1982). 
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kitchen.”29  One estimate suggests that only two percent of physicians 
had hospital privileges.30 
With medical advances, physicians began to rely more on the 
“diagnostic and therapeutic facilities which only a hospital could pro-
vide.”31  Hospital appointments increased in value as hospitals became 
“indispensable for surgical practice and specialization.”32  Between 
1870 and 1910, hospitals evolved “[f]rom refuges mainly for the 
homeless poor and insane . . . into doctors’ workshops for all types 
and classes of patients.”33  In this same period of time, “[t]he number 
of hospitals increased from 178 in 1873 to 4359 in 1909.”34  By 1930, 
the number of hospitals had increased to 6719.35 
In 1913, the American College of Surgeons (“ACS”) was organ-
ized36 to facilitate the standardization of hospital care through the 
implementation of minimum safety and performance requirements.37  
Shortly thereafter, the voluntary “Minimum Standard” was estab-
lished by the ACS, followed by the creation of the Hospital Standardi-
zation Program (“HSP”).38  The goal of the HSP was to study and 
monitor hospitals in order to refine and expand upon the Minimum 
Standard.39  One of the steps advocated by the Minimum Standard 
was self-regulation through an organized medical staff.40  For exam-
ple, the Minimum Standard required “‘[t]hat physicians and sur-
geons privileged to practice in the hospital be organized as a definite 
medical staff’ and “‘[t]hat the medical staff initiate and, with the ap-
proval of the governing board of the hospital, adopt rules, regula-
 
 29 Morris J. Vogel, The Transformation of the American Hospital, 1850–1920, in 
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL HISTORY 105, 105–06 (Susan Reverby & 
David Rosner eds., 1979). 
 30 STARR, supra note 28, at 162. 
 31 MILTON I. ROEMER & JAY W. FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL STAFF 
ORGANIZATION AND HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE 35 (1971). 
 32 STARR, supra note 28, at 163. 
 33 Id. at 146. 
 34 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private 
Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 846 (1983). 
 35 Id. 
 36 ROEMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 35. 
 37 See Jost, supra note 34, at 847; DAVIS, supra note 27, at 63, 70–71. 
 38 Jost, supra note 34, at 848. 
 39 Id. (“[T]he HSP sought regularly to analyze and audit hospital progress toward 
compliance with the minimum HSP standards.  Like the earlier ACS standards, HSP 
standards focused on the organization and suitability of the hospitals for physicians.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 40 Dallon, supra note 26, at 602 (citing MALCOLM T. MACEACHERN, HOSPITAL 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 669–70 (3d ed. 1957)). 
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tions, and policies governing the professional work of the hospital.’”41  
Prior to this time, many ‘open staff’ hospitals allowed any physician, 
regardless of qualifications, to admit and care for patients in the hos-
pital.42  Others allowed physicians onto the medical staff based on “fa-
voritism rather than skill.”43  Hospital standardization operated to 
protect the public by “preventing hospitals from being imposed upon 
by incompetent physicians,”44 by prescribing requirements for mem-
bership on the medical staff, and by fostering “collective responsibil-
ity for standards among the ‘open staff’ itself.”45 
By 1935, ninety percent of the hospitals surveyed by HSP had or-
ganized medical staffs.46  In 1951, the ACS, the American Hospital As-
sociation, the American Medical Association, the American College 
of Physicians and the Canadian Medical Association created the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (“JCAH”).47  In 1952, the 
ACS transferred the HSP to the JCAH.48  The JCAH was later re-
named the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
zations (“JCAHO”).49  Today, JCAHO continues to require that the 
independent, self-governing medical staff have “overall responsibility 
for the quality of the professional services provided by individuals 
with clinical privileges, as well as the responsibility of accounting 
therefore to the governing body.”50  JCAHO is a private, non-profit 
organization and hospitals are not required to follow its guidelines.51  
However, most hospitals work diligently to maintain JCAHO compli-
ance because JCAHO accreditation is required in order to qualify for 
state Medicare payments and to meet many state licensure require-
ments. 
 
 41 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting MACEACHERN, supra note 40, at 669–70). 
 42 See Jost, supra note 34, at 847. 
 43 ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 53 (1989). 
 44 See Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068, 1072 (Tex. App. 1920). 
 45 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 53. 
 46 See Jost, supra note 34, at 848–49. 
 47 See AMA (AMA History) 1941 to 1960, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ 
category/1926.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2006). 
 48 Jost, supra note 34, at 850–51. 
 49 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals was renamed the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations in 1987.  Kinney, supra 
note 25, at 52 n.25. 
 50 JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE 
ACCREDITATION  MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK ¶ MS.1, at MS-2 
(1999) [hereinafter CAMH]. 
 51 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health 
Care Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 
15, 15. 
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In addition to the role that the medical staff has in assuring the 
quality of patient care, medical staff members also have a role in the 
operation of the hospital.  “The medical staff is an organized, self-
governing collective that develops and adopts its own bylaws, rules, 
and regulations.”52 
The bylaws establish, among other things: (1) a medical staff ex-
ecutive committee and define its functions; (2) “[f]air-hearing 
and appellate review mechanisms for medical staff members and 
other individuals holding clinical privileges”; (3) “[m]echanisms 
for corrective action, including indications and procedures for 
automatic and summary suspension of an individual’s medical 
staff membership or clinical privileges”; (4)“the medical staff’s 
organization, including categories of medical staff membership”; 
(5) “[a] mechanism designed to provide for effective communica-
tion among the medical staff, hospital administration, and gov-
erning body”; and (6) “[m]edical staff representation and partici-
pation in any hospital deliberation affecting the discharge of 
medical staff responsibilities.”53 
Membership on the medical staff of a hospital is an essential 
precondition to the ability to admit patients into that hospital for 
treatment.54  The scope of the services the physician may provide at 
the hospital is defined by the “clinical privileges” that the hospital 
grants the physician.55  Membership on the medical staff does not 
guarantee a grant of clinical privileges56 which is dependent on the 
particular physician’s education, license, experience, training, com-
petence, judgment and health.57 
III. THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS 
It is the hospital medical staff’s obligation to bear “the overall re-
sponsibility for the quality of the professional services provided by in-
dividuals with clinical privileges . . . .”58  While the term ‘peer review’ 
can be used in the context of other professions, the usual use of the 
term refers to the evaluation of the performance of a physician by 
 
 52 Dallon, supra note 26, at 609. 
 53 Id. (alterations in original) (citing CAMH, supra note 50, ¶¶ MS.2.3 to 
MS.2.3.8, at MS-3 to MS-4). 
 54 See CAMH, supra note 50, ¶ MS 6.5.1, at MS-12. 
 55 Id. ¶ MS.1.1.2, at MS-2, ¶ MS.6.4 at MS-12. 
 56 David J. Behinfar, Exclusive Contracting Between Hospitals and Physicians and the 
Use of Economic Credentialing, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 71, 78 (1996). 
 57 See CAMH, supra note 50, ¶ MS.1 n.*, at MS-2; see also id. ¶ MS.6.4, at MS-12. 
 58 Id. ¶ MS.1, at MS-2. 
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other physicians pursuant to this obligation.59  In a hospital setting, 
the term ‘peer review’ describes several distinct activities which are 
generally performed by a hospital medical staff committee, all with 
the goal of maintaining or improving quality of patient care.  One 
such activity involves the assembly and assessment of information re-
garding the competence and professional conduct of those physicians 
seeking hospital staff privileges for the first time or applying for the 
renewal of those privileges.60  This process is referred to as the cre-
dentialing process.61 
Another activity involves the ongoing collection and evaluation 
of data regarding the professionalism and competence of each physi-
cian who is a current member of the hospital staff.62  If this evaluative 
process reveals a physician who is found lacking, informal or formal 
punitive or restrictive measures may be imposed to bring about im-
provement in the subject physician’s performance.  Informal meas-
ures include self-correction, assistance by colleagues, supervisory 
oversight and guidance with later re-assessment.63  Informal measures 
are usually undertaken by the subject physician’s department chair 
and the chief of staff.  If informal measures are either ineffectual or 
deemed to be inadequate from the onset, what this Article will refer 
to as the formal peer review process will be initiated.  Formal peer re-
view could result in a suspension of staff privileges until corrective 
measures are taken by the physician or further education is received 
by the physician, restrictions on the scope of practice the physician 
 
 59 SLEE’S, supra note 9, at 474. 
 60 CREDENTIALING AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICE GROUP OF THE AM. HEALTH 
LAWYER’S ASS’N, PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PEER REVIEW 
GUIDEBOOK]. 
 61 CAMH, supra note 50, at MS-7.  While information gathering and analysis usu-
ally lies in the hands of a credentialing committee, the medical staff executive com-
mittee ultimately reviews the qualifications of applicants and makes recommenda-
tions that are acted on by the governing body.  Id. at MS-4.  The governing body, 
commonly a board of directors, is often made up of lay persons who tend to accept 
the medical judgments of the medical executive committee.  Colteaux, supra note 11, 
at 907. 
 62 CAMH, supra note 50, ¶¶ MS.8 to MS.8.4, at MS-13 to MS-14.  CAMH requires 
that the medical staff of hospitals participate in “performance improvement activi-
ties” and implement a properly designed peer review process as part of continued 
accreditation.  Id.  Medicare’s Conditions of Participation for Hospitals also require 
peer review by mandating that hospitals conduct ongoing periodic evaluations of its 
physicians as part of “an effective, ongoing, hospital-wide, data-driven quality assess-
ment and performance improvement program. . . . [that] involves all hospital  
departments and services,” and that “track[s] medical errors and adverse patient 
events, analyze[s] their causes, and implement[s] preventative actions and mecha-
nisms . . . .”  42 C.F.R. § 482.21 (2005). 
 63 PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 60, at 2–3. 
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may engage in within the hospital, or termination of staff privileges 
altogether.64 
There are several general categories of conduct that could trig-
ger the imposition of formal sanctions.  Examples include inadequate 
clinical competence, physical and mental impairment, disruptive be-
havior, loss of license or malpractice insurance, or repeated violations 
of medical staff by-laws.  This Article focuses on the standards which 
are used to evaluate clinical competence.  This evaluation can occur 
in situations when a physician is either denied staff privileges in the 
first instance based on clinical competence concerns, or when staff 
privileges are curtailed, terminated, or not renewed as a result of al-
legations of clinical incompetence. 
When a physician is an active member of the medical staff, the 
formal peer review process is commonly triggered by the report of an 
event or a series of events that raises questions about a physician’s 
clinical competence.65  The exact process to be followed is unique to 
each individual hospital and is described in that institution’s medical 
staff by-laws.  However, there are many features of the process that 
are common to most hospitals.  First, as a general rule, medical staff 
by-laws are enforceable contracts between the hospital and the mem-
bers of the medical staff.66  Generally, the by-laws will designate those 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 22.  Another point at which a physician could effectively have staff privi-
leges terminated is at the very start of his or her career.  Most hospitals place newly 
accepted staff members on a one to two year probationary period.  At the end of the 
probationary period, the physician’s records are reviewed by the medical executive 
committee which then recommends promotion to full medical staff status, termina-
tion or an extension of the probationary period.  See, e.g., Chessick v. Sherman Hosp. 
Ass’n, 546 N.E.2d 1153, 1155–56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (restrictions placed on ad-
vancement from probationary status to full staff based on ‘substandard’ care).  Ter-
mination can also arise in the form of non-renewal of privileges.  A physician’s ap-
pointment to the medical staff is generally for only one to two years, creating an 
annual or bi-annual need to reapply.  It is common for an investigation into the level 
of a physician’s competence to coincide with this renewal period.  See, e.g., Duby v. 
Jordan Hosp., 341 N.E.2d 876, 878–79 (Mass. 1976) (attempted termination of phy-
sician’s privileges failed as the necessary two-thirds vote under the by-law for termina-
tion not obtained; physician’s privileges were not renewed as a result of the same 
charges based on a less rigorous provision of the by-laws dealing with renewal that 
only required a simple majority); Dayan v. Wood River Twp. Hosp., 152 N.E.2d 205, 
206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958).  As a result of the timing, the investigation could lead the 
board of directors to deny the renewal of the physician’s staff privileges.  In this cir-
cumstance, under some by-laws, the appeal of the denial of renewal is made directly 
to the board of directors.  In this fashion, the board of directors could perform the 
roles of investigator, prosecutor, jury, and appellate body. 
 66 See MICHAEL A. CASSIDY, IMMUNITY FOR CREDENTIALING DECISIONS UNDER 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 38 (2003).  Some courts do not view the act of adopting 
medical staff by-laws as creating a contract, but have found consideration to support 
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individuals who, or bodies which, can make a request to institute an 
investigation, referred to either as a complaint or as a request for cor-
rective action.  The by-laws will also identify the individuals who, or 
body which, can make the decision on whether to authorize an inves-
tigation.67  Normally, decisions that are not time-sensitive are made by 
the medical staff executive committee.68  In a situation requiring a 
rapid response, the decision is commonly made jointly by the physi-
cian’s department chair and the chief of staff.69  When the situation 
poses ‘immediate danger’ to patients warranting immediate summary 
suspension of the physician’s staff privileges, one individual can be 
designated as the decision-maker, commonly the chief of staff, or the 
decision can be made by the executive committee.70 
If a decision is made to investigate a complaint, usually the phy-
sician is notified immediately,71 although this is not always the case.72  
 
finding a contract in subsequent acts.  See, e.g., Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs., 
488 S.E.2d 284, 287–88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (enactment of by-laws pursuant to pre-
existing duty does not create a contract; but offering staff privileges is sufficient con-
sideration to create same).  See also Sadler v. Dimensions Health Corp., 787 A.2d 807 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 836 A.2d 655 (2003).  Cf. Monroe v. 
AMI Hosps. of Tex., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (by-laws do 
not constitute contract as they are adopted pursuant to preexisting duty). 
 67 PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 60, at 23. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.  In Pulido v. St. Joseph Memorial Hospital, 547 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1989), the court granted summary judgment against a physician who complained 
that the four-member executive committee first made the initial decision that sum-
mary suspension of staff privileges was warranted.  Then, when the physician re-
quested a hearing, the same four-member executive committee conducted the hear-
ing on the merits of its own decision where it upheld the summary suspension.  Id. at 
1387–88.  The hospital board of trustees held an appellate review and affirmed.  Id. 
 71 The PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK advocates giving the physician the full details of 
the complaint: 
     Although applicable case law may not require notice to the physi-
cian prior to the decision to investigate, it would be hard to imagine a 
situation in which the sense of urgency would outweigh the benefits of 
at least an informal discussion with the affected physician before the 
decision is made.  Because the affected physician’s ability to respond 
will depend on understanding the nature of the complaint, counsel 
should consider giving him or her the full details of the complaint.  
Some medical staffs wrestle with the balance between giving the af-
fected physician all of the information relevant to the complaint and 
the desire to protect the complainant(s).  One way to strike that bal-
ance is to provide the affected physician with all of the information 
relevant to the complaint, along with a warning regarding the serious 
consequences of unapproved contact with or retaliation against the 
complainant(s). 
PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 60, at 23.  See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 
252 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn. 1977) (physician notified of investigation). 
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Either the executive committee will conduct the investigation itself, 
or an ad hoc committee made up of members of the general medical 
staff will be appointed to conduct the investigation.  The physician 
may or may not be interviewed in this investigation phase.  Beyond 
this interview, the physician has no role in the investigation phase. 
The steps that are taken once the investigation is complete de-
pend upon whether an ad hoc committee of the medical staff or the 
medical executive committee has conducted the investigation.  If the 
investigation has been undertaken by an ad hoc committee, this 
committee will then draft a set of charges and make recommenda-
tions for corrective actions based upon those charges, referred to 
commonly as the recommended corrective action.73  Typically, the 
recommended corrective action of the ad hoc committee is sent di-
rectly to the physician who may then appeal it to the executive com-
mittee.  The executive committee will then conduct a hearing and 
reach a judgment.  This judgment can then be appealed by the physi-
cian to the governing body of the hospital.  The appeal is based on 
the record created by the hearing in front of the executive commit-
tee.74  It is common for the board of directors to be made up of lay 
 
 72 Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (physi-
cian was not informed of investigation). 
 73 Alternatively, it is also common for the ad hoc committee to send the recom-
mended corrective action to the executive committee for approval.  The executive 
committee may accept, revise, or reject any portion of the recommended action.  
The recommended action, as adopted, is provided to the physician who may appeal 
it to the governing body of the hospital, commonly a board of directors or board of 
managers.  After a hearing on the matter, the decision of the board of directors then 
constitutes a final action of the hospital that the physician can appeal to a trial court. 
 74 However, if the executive committee has conducted the investigation, a differ-
ent set of routes is possible.  The executive committee will draft the recommended 
action which will then be provided to the physician.  PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra 
note 60, at 28.  If the physician exercises the right to appeal, a hearing will be held to 
determine the validity of the charges contained in the recommended action.  If the 
executive committee has conducted the investigation, this hearing will either be 
conducted directly by the hospital board of directors, or an ad hoc committee of the 
medical staff will be constituted as the hearing panel, with the board of directors 
hearing any appeal of this ad hoc committee’s decision.  In Carson v. Northwest Com-
munity Hospital, 548 N.E.2d 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), the executive committee both 
conducted the investigation and recommended that the physician be summarily sus-
pended.  Id. at 580.  The physician requested a hearing before the executive commit-
tee.  After the hearing, the executive committee issued a decision sustaining the sus-
pension based on its finding that the physician provided ‘inadequate care.’  Id.  The 
physician appealed and an ad hoc panel of five physicians convened nine times over 
six months to hear the case.  Id.  The panel found that the summary suspension 
should be lifted, conditioned on completion of training and one year probationary 
status.  Id.  The hospital board of directors rejected the panel’s recommendation and 
reinstated the summary suspension.  Id. 
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persons who tend to accept the medical judgments of the medical 
executive committee.75  As explained in the next section, if this hear-
ing process is fundamentally fair, the participants in the process will 
be granted immunity from suit by the physician under the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.76 
IV. THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
The interests of the public, the physician, and the hospital in the 
peer review process have been recognized by Congress77 by the pas-
sage of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”).78  
HCQIA was designed both to encourage the peer review79 of physi-
cians and to ensure that this process is fair.  Prior to HCQIA, partici-
pants in the peer review process risked being sued by physicians seek-
ing monetary damages from adverse actions.  Creative lawyering 
engendered claims such as breach of contract for violating medical 
staff by-laws, tortious interference with business relations, violation of 
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, breach of confidential 
relationship, conspiracy, defamation, deprivation of the right to prac-
tice a profession,80 intentional infliction of emotional distress and an-
titrust violations.81  With the passage of HCQIA, Congress specifically 
concluded that the quality of medical care would be enhanced by 
peer review through the deterrence of medical malpractice82 and the 
identification of incompetent physicians.83  Acting on this belief, 
Congress passed HCQIA, which grants qualified immunity84 from suit 
 
 75 Colteaux, supra note 11, at 907. 
 76 See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 77 Dallon, supra note 26, at 625. 
 78 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–52 (2000). 
 79 Under HCQIA, formal sanction proceedings are referred to as ‘professional 
review’ actions.  Id. at § 11151(9). 
 80 Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 581 S.E.2d 551, 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 81 For a listing of the cases in which each of these theories was asserted, see PEER 
REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 60, at 9. 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 11101(3) (2000) (peer review is a factor in the resolution of the 
national issue of medical malpractice). 
 83 Congress explained that “[t]he purpose of this legislation is to improve the 
quality of medical care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other 
physicians who are incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior.”  U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., HEALTH CARE QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6384; Goldsmith v. Harding Hosp., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 187, 
188–89 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
 84 HCQIA provides a qualified immunity from liability “in damages under any law 
of the United States or of any state . . . with respect to [a professional peer review] 
action,” 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2000), when “adequate notice and hearing proce-
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for those who participate in the peer review process, while at the 
same time conditioning this immunity upon the provision of ade-
quate notice and fair process to the physician.85  This immunity de-
prives physicians of full access to the judicial system and is only war-
ranted if, in fact, peer review is being used to enhance the quality of 
patient care. 
There are four basic conditions which must be met in order to 
obtain HCQIA immunity for the imposition of formal sanctions.  
These sanctions must have been imposed: 
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the further-
ance of quality health care, 
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, 
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded 
to the physician involved or after such other procedures as 
are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and 
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the 
facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and 
after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).86 
A plaintiff physician who wishes to avoid HCQIA immunity and sue 
those who participated in the peer review process carries the burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that one of these 
four criteria has not been fulfilled.87  This allocation of the burden of 
proof creates a rebuttable presumption that all four of the criteria 
have been fulfilled.  The question of whether the formal sanction was 
reasonable is an objective one88 and the subjective good faith of the 
 
dures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are 
fair to the physician under the circumstances . . . .”  Id. § 11112(a)(3). 
 85 See, e.g., Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 
2002); Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1031 (4th Cir. 1994), 
aff’d, No. 96-1978, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 893 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 1998); Patrick v. Floyd 
Med. Ctr., 565 S.E. 2d 491, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1457, 2002 
Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2002); Peyton v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., No. E2001-
02477-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 770, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002). 
 86 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2000).  The question of what the phrase “or after such 
other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances” means was 
addressed in Islami v. Covenant Medical Center, 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Iowa 
1992).  In Islami, the court found that this same language contained in the hospital 
by-laws was written to capture the general rule that hospitals are not required to 
comply with the by-laws in every technical aspect.  Id.  This language from the hospi-
tal’s by-laws was modeled directly upon § 11112(a).  Id. at 1377.  The court found 
that both this language and the ‘substantial compliance’ inquiry are directed toward 
a determination of whether the procedures provided to the physician were funda-
mentally fair.  Id. at 1374. 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2000). 
 88 Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 635 (3d Cir. 1996); Austin v. McNa-
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hospital is not relevant.89  The issue of the qualification for HCQIA 
immunity is a question that is answered by the court as a matter of 
law.90 
HCQIA lists a number of suggested91 procedures that a hospital 
may utilize to provide adequate notice and a fair hearing.  The statute 
expressly states that declining to follow these suggestions does not 
equate to a failure to provide an adequate notice or a fair hearing 
when other adequate processes are in place.92  With regard to notice, 
it is suggested that a physician be provided a notice that includes the 
following information: 
(1) that a professional review action has been proposed to be 
taken against the physician, 
(2) [the] reasons for the proposed action, 
(3) that the physician has the right to request a hearing on the 
proposed action, 
(4) any time limit (of not less than 30 days) within which to re-
quest such a hearing, and 
(5) a summary of the [physician’s hearing] rights . . . .93 
With regard to the actual hearing, it is suggested that the physician 
be given the right: 
(1) to representation by an attorney or other person of the phy-
sician’s choice, 
(2) to have a record made of the proceedings, . . . 
(3) to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, 
 
mara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992); Egan v. Athol Mem’l Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 37, 
42 (D. Mass. 1997), aff’d per curiam, 134 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
964 (1998); Monroe v. AMI Hosps. of Texas, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (S.D. Tex. 
1994); Doctor’s Med. Clinic v. City of Jackson, 569 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 581 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1998); Schilling v. Moore, 545 
N.W.2d 442, 444 (Neb. 1996). 
 89 Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 840 (3d Cir. 1999); Davenport v. 
Ne. Ga. Med. Ctr., 542 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Ga. App. Ct. 2000); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. 
of Baltimore, Inc., 680 A.2d 1067, 1079 (Md. 1996); Manzetti v. Mercy Hosp. of Pitts-
burgh, 776 A.2d 938, 946 (Pa. 2001). 
 90 Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019 (1995). 
 91 While these procedures are suggested, they are not required for good reason.  
For example, if a patient’s health is in ‘imminent danger’ unless immediate action is 
taken, it may not be practical to provide the above procedural protections to the 
physician prior to summary suspension.  42 U.S.C. § 11112(c)(2) (2000).  As long as 
the post-deprivation hearing is fundamentally fair, HCQIA immunity will attach. 
 92 Egan, 971 F. Supp. at 42; Mathews, 883 F. Supp. at 1016; Monroe, 877 F. Supp. at 
1028; Goldsmith v. Harding Hosp. Inc., 762 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Gill v. 
Mercy Hosp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988). 
 93 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(1) (2000). 
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(4) to present evidence determined to be relevant by the hear-
ing officer, regardless of its admissibility in a court of law, 
and 
(5) to submit a written statement at the close of the hearing.94 
Finally, regardless of compliance with HCQIA, it is important to 
note that a physician may still sue for injunctive and other types of 
equitable relief.  For example, a physician can still bring an action for 
injunctive relief to bar the imposition of any corrective action alleg-
ing that either the due process guaranteed by the Constitution or 
common law, or the fair process granted by the medical staff by-laws, 
has not been provided.95 
The desire to earn HCQIA immunity supplies a strong motiva-
tion to provide a formal peer review process in keeping with HCQIA’s 
criteria for what kind and amount of notice is sufficient to be ‘ade-
quate notice’ and what rights granted to a physician will be enough 
for the proceedings to be considered ‘fair.’  If the HCQIA criteria are 
met, the physician will be barred from pursuing an action in damages 
against those who participated in the process.  Thus, even in those 
states that have heretofore found that due process fairness concerns 
are inapplicable to the formal peer review process undertaken by pri-
vate hospitals, HCQIA creates a notice and fairness floor for peer re-
view participants who wish to avoid suit for damages.96 
V. FAIR PROCESS 
What is a fair process?  A fair process is a process which weighs 
the interests of the stakeholders in the process, balances them and 
properly protects those interests accordingly.97  In the context of peer 
review, a fair process is one which employs both the process protec-
tions and the standards necessary to safeguard the relative interests of 
 
 94 Id. § 11112(b)(3)(C). 
 95 See, e.g., Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc, 308 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 
2002); Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1031 (4th Cir. 1994), 
aff’d by, No. 96-1978, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 893 (4th Cir. 1998); Patrick v. Floyd Med. 
Ctr., 565 S.E.2d 491, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1457, 2002 Ga. 
LEXIS 713 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2002); Peyton v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., No. E2001-02477-
COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 770, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002). 
 96 Many state statutes provide a much broader immunity for both the individual 
participants in the peer review process and the hospital.  See generally Susan O. 
Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—Is It Time For A Change?, 
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (1999) (suggesting that peer review protection statutes do not 
encourage peer review).  Unlike HCQIA, in most cases, the state immunity provisions 
will not provide immunity from federal antitrust liability.  See Islami v. Covenant Med. 
Ctr., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1379–80 (N.D. Iowa 1992). 
 97 See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
1198 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1179 
the stakeholders.  Following the passage of HCQIA, it appears that 
most hospitals are utilizing adequate process protections in peer re-
view hearings.  On the other hand, based at least on a survey of the 
peer review cases being appealed to the courts, the substantive stan-
dards being used to measure physician competence in peer review do 
not properly protect the interests of all of the stakeholders, rendering 
the process fundamentally unfair.  This lack of fundamental fairness 
places all of the participants in the peer review process at risk of los-
ing HCQIA immunity. 
A. Stakeholders in Peer Review 
There are many competing interests at stake in the judicial re-
view of a negative peer review outcome.  The physician who pursues 
the appeal has an interest in the ability to practice his or her profes-
sion.98  The hospital has an interest in maintaining its autonomy in 
staffing decisions, the provision of quality patient care and the avoid-
ance of liability for negligent credentialing and negligent provision of 
care by its physicians.99  The public has a foot in both camps; it has an 
interest in both the availability of quality medical care and in the abil-
ity of individuals to choose their own health care providers.100 
 
 98 Sheree Lynn McCall, A Hospital’s Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting 
Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 175 (1980). 
 99 See generally John D. Hodson, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Sanitarium for 
Negligence of Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R. 4th 235 (1987) (detailing rejection of 
charitable immunity for hospitals); see generally also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH 
LAW § 7-1, at 378–79 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW] (dis-
cussing erosion of governmental immunity); Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, 
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 381, 388 (1998) (discussing the enterprise liability doctrine); Daniel L. 
Icenogle, Annotation, Hospital Liability as to Diagnosis and Care of Patients in Emergency 
Room, 58 A.L.R. 5th 613 (1988); Martin C. Williams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, 
Hospital Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 445–
57 (1996) (discussing non-delegable duty doctrine). 
 100 “[T]he power to select a medical staff is a fiduciary power to be exercised rea-
sonably and for the public good.”  Kiracofe v. Reid Mem’l Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 
1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (Ratliff, J., concurring) (citing Greisman v. Newcomb 
Hosp., 192 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1963)). 
A non-profit private hospital serving the public generally is a quasi-
public institution whose obligation to serve the public is the linchpin of 
its public trust and the fiduciary relationship which arises out of the 
management of that trust. . . . When a hospital’s board of trustees or 
directors is in the process of determining whether a doctor should be 
admitted to its staff, the hospital’s public trust is directly involved in 
view of the public’s interest in the quality and availability of medical 
service.  The board, of course, has an interest in preserving its auton-
omy and in maintaining control over the quality of its staff.  Addition-
ally, doctors, particularly surgeons, have a substantial interest in favor-
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The extent of the impact of the peer review process on the in-
terests of the hospital and the public is fairly obvious.  On the other 
hand, the extent of the impact that the peer review process can have 
on the interests of a physician is less apparent.  The termination of 
staff privileges101 has major implications for a physician’s ability to 
practice medicine.102  The clearest example of this impact is when 
there is only one hospital facility in the community.103  Termination of 
 
able responses to their applications for staff membership, for their abil-
ity to pursue their profession may depend on the availability of neces-
sary hospital facilities. 
Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 401 A.2d 533, 537 (N.J. 1979). 
 101 In many states, the general rule is that a physician’s staff privileges constitute a 
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  See, e.g., Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Where medi-
cal staff privileges have been held to constitute an interest protected by the four-
teenth amendment, it has been because there was an explicit or implicit agreement 
providing for no termination of the privileges without cause and a hearing, or be-
cause denial of staff privileges ‘might effectively foreclose . . . practicing in the area 
because of harm to [a] professional reputation and because of the lack of other 
[comparable] facilities.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Daly v. Sprague, 675 F.2d 
716, 727 (5th Cir. 1982)); Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(“The state of Hawaii has recognized a licensed doctor’s property right in employ-
ment as a probationary hospital staff member.”); Anton v. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., 
567 P.2d 1162, 1174 (Cal. 1977) (“‘[T]he essential nature of a qualified physician’s 
right to use the facilities of a hospital is a property interest which directly relates to 
the pursuit of his livelihood.’  This interest is clearly fundamental . . . .”). 
 102 FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 99, § 7-1, at 378 (explaining that pre-
condition to the practice of medicine is access to hospitals); McCall, supra note 98, at 
175 (“A physician’s livelihood is dependent on acquiring and maintaining hospital 
staff privileges.  The access to hospital facilities is necessary for most physicians to 
adequately treat and care for patients, to maintain their medical practice, and to pur-
sue their medical career.”); Note, The Physician’s Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The 
Public-Private Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 510–11 (a successful doctor must 
have access to hospitals). 
 103 Kiracofe, 461 N.E.2d at 1142 (noting that when a hospital is the only one in a 
community, “its economic impact is great, and the denial of hospital privileges, in 
many cases, is tantamount to denying a physician the opportunity to practice his or 
her chosen profession”).  In Greisman, 192 A.2d at 824–25, the court described the 
situation as follows: 
     The Newcomb Hospital is the only hospital in the Vineland metro-
politan area and it is publicly dedicated, primarily to the care of the 
sick and injured of Vineland and its vicinity . . . . Doctors need hospital 
facilities and a physician practicing in the metropolitan Vineland area 
will understandably seek them at the Newcomb Hospital.  Further-
more, every patient of his will want the Newcomb Hospital facilities to 
be readily available.  It hardly suffices to say that the patient could en-
ter the hospital under the care of a member of the existing staff, for his 
personal physician would have no opportunity of participating in his 
treatment; nor does it suffice to say that there are other hospitals out-
side the metropolitan Vineland area, for they may be too distant or un-
suitable to his needs and desires.  All this indicates very pointedly that, 
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clinical privileges at that one hospital means that the physician will be 
barred from the practice of medicine in that community.104  Even for 
a physician who practices in a very large community with multiple 
hospitals, an adverse peer review outcome can have the same disas-
trous result.  Physicians are required by hospitals to disclose adverse 
actions at other hospitals when either renewing privileges or applying 
for privileges at a new hospital.  Hospitals do not rely solely on a phy-
sician’s obligation to disclose, but also inquire into a physician’s his-
tory with state licensing boards and the National Federation of State 
Medical Boards Physician Disciplinary Data Bank.105  In addition, in 
the 1980s, HCQIA106 set up a National Practitioner Data Bank 
(“NPDB”) which compiles data on physicians who have either had 
their hospital privileges limited in some manner or have had some 
other adverse action taken against them, have had adverse actions 
taken against them as a result of proceedings instituted by a state un-
der its licensure authority or have had a judgment entered against 
them in a malpractice action.107  The NPDB supplies hospitals with in-
formation on physicians applying for staff privileges.108  This central 
information storehouse inhibits physicians with suspect practice 
backgrounds from moving from state to state without disclosing their 
practice histories.  HCQIA mandates that all health care entities109 re-
port any formal sanctions to the state licensure board which, in turn, 
must send the report to the NPDB.110  This reporting activity is also 
 
while the managing officials may have discretionary powers in the se-
lection of the medical staff, those powers are deeply imbedded in pub-
lic aspects, and are rightly viewed, for policy reasons . . . as fiduciary 
powers to be exercised reasonably and for the public good. 
Id. at 824. 
 104 Kiracofe, 461 N.E.2d at 1142; Greisman, 192 A.2d at 824–25. 
 105 CAMH, supra note 50, ¶ MS.5.4.3.2, at MS-8. 
 106 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2000). 
 107 Id. § 11133. 
 108 If a hospital fails to inquire into a physician’s history with the NPDB first upon 
an initial credentialing request, and again every two years after the request is 
granted, then a presumption arises that the hospital is aware of the information con-
tained in the files.  Id. § 11135(b).  This creates the specter of direct liability for neg-
ligent credentialing if the physician injures a hospital’s patient. 
 109 Id. § 11151(4).  If a report is not filed, any HCQIA immunity is lost.  The non-
complying entity is listed in the Federal Register, and any peer review proceedings 
leading to formal sanctions that are commenced in the three year period of time 
starting thirty days after the publication are barred from HCQIA immunity.  Id. § 
11111(b). 
 110 Id. § 11133.  Other entities that report to the NPDB include insurance compa-
nies, doctors and hospitals that settle or pay judgments in malpractice actions, and 
state licensure boards that sanction physicians. 
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insulated from liability if the report is made without knowledge of 
any false information contained in the report.111 
B. Judicial Review of the Fairness of Hospital Peer Review Proceedings 
The courts have struck a balance between the interests of the 
physician, the hospital, and the public decidedly in favor of the inter-
ests of the public and the hospital by providing a high level of defer-
ence to hospital staffing decisions in judicial review of adverse peer 
review actions: 
Human lives are at stake, and the governing board must be given 
discretion in its selection so that it can have confidence in the 
competence and moral commitment of its staff.  The evaluation 
of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the specialized 
expertise of their peers, subject only to limited judicial surveil-
lance.112 
On the other hand, most courts do provide limited protections 
for the interests of physicians in pursuing their profession, acknowl-
edging that “[b]oth doctors and their patients can suffer if otherwise 
qualified doctors are wrongly denied staff privileges.”113  While recog-
nizing their limitations with regard to factual evaluations of medical 
competence, courts are in agreement that they are “equipped to de-
termine whether a hospital governing body has followed its bylaws 
and whether a decision regarding an application for privileges was 
made in accordance with basic principles of fairness and due process 
of law.”114  Thus, most courts claim that they “require that the proce-
dures employed by the hospital are fair, that the standards set by the 
hospital are reasonable, and that they have been applied without ar-
bitrariness and capriciousness.”115  Therefore, under differing theo-
ries,116 it appears on the face of it that, at a minimum, courts review an 
adverse peer review outcome to ensure that the hospital provided the 
 
 111 42 U.S.C. § 11137(c) (2000). 
 112 Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of the Val Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th 
Cir. 1971); see also Dallon, supra note 26, at 624. 
 113 Balkissoon v. Capitol Hill Hosp., 558 A.2d 304, 308 (D.C. 1989) (quoting 
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 526 A.2d 697, 701 (N.J. 1987)). 
 114 Kiester v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 843 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Alaska 1992). 
 115 Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978).  See also Sokol v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 173 F.3d 1026, 
1030 (6th Cir. 1999) (In a restriction of clinical privileges appeal, the court held that 
“hospitals must provide ‘procedural due process . . . in adopting and applying’ ‘rea-
sonable, nondiscriminatory criteria for the privilege of practicing’ surgery in the 
hospital.” (alteration in original) (quoting Khan v. Suburban Cmty. Hosp., 538 
N.E.2d 113, 114 (Ohio 1999))). 
 116 See Dallon, supra note 26, at 626–38. 
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physician with what amounts to fundamental fairness and procedural 
due process.117  For governmental institutions, this protection has its 
basis in the Constitution.118  For private hospitals, “the due process re-
view is based on contract (the bylaws), fiduciary duty, common law 
fairness, or statute.”119  While “foundational factual findings must be 
sustained if supported by substantial evidence,”120 the question of 
“whether the administrative proceedings were fundamentally fair is a 
question of law to be decided on appeal.”121 
 
 117 In addition, fairness principles call for revealed procedures and for the applica-
tion of the clearly articulated, known standards.  “Revealed procedures—procedures 
seen and comprehended—are essential to an individual’s effective and comfortable 
participation in the agency’s application of its standards to her.”  ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. 
& WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.6.1, at 171 (2d ed. 2001). 
 118 Dallon, supra note 26, at 678. 
 119 Id.  Courts have often distinguished between public and private hospitals in 
explaining the basis of judicial review.  See McCall, supra note 98, at 175–90.  See also 
Kiester, 843 P.2d at 1223 (“We note a growing trend which affords judicial review to 
ensure that no hospital, whether public or private, establishes rules governing admis-
sion which permit exclusion on an arbitrary or irrational basis, or which are unrea-
sonably susceptible to arbitrary or discriminatory application.” (citing Miller v. Ei-
senhower Med. Ctr., 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980))); Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of the Val 
Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1971) (as state funds are used to 
construct, maintain and operate private hospitals, their acts are state acts and must 
comport with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment); Storrs v. Lutheran 
Hosps. & Homes Soc’y of Am., Inc., 609 P.2d 24, 28 (Alaska 1980) (Due process stan-
dards apply in a private hospital as it “is a quasi-public hospital because it is the only 
hospital serving the community, the construction of the hospital was funded in sig-
nificant part by state and federal grants, and over twenty-five per cent of the funds 
received for hospital services comes from governmental sources.”).  See also Anton v. 
San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., 567 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Cal. 1977); Silver v. Castle Mem’l 
Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 571 (Haw. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1131 (1973); Greisman v. 
Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 818–19 (N.J. 1963); Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 
Inc., 559 P.2d 186, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). 
There are some jurisdictions that have given mere lip service to the concept that 
the physician is owed a fair and reasonable process in private hospitals.  For example, 
in Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1987), the court held that a physician’s 
due process, fair hearing rights were not violated when he was barred from represen-
tation by a lawyer, was not presented with an opportunity to produce witnesses on his 
behalf, was charged with conduct when the same conduct had been part of prior 
hearings where he was exonerated, and was not presented with a written decision set-
ting forth the findings of the peer review panel, all under a process with no written 
guidelines or standards.  Id. at 1017–18.  As a practical matter, the cases that give 
such a narrow reading to the amount of process due a physician no longer have 
much influence on the formal peer review process.  As explained in the prior sec-
tion, the desire to earn HCQIA immunity supplies a strong motivation to provide a 
formal peer review process more in keeping with the ideals described by the court in 
Kiester. 
 120 Rosenblit v. Superior Court of Orange County, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 121 Id. 
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1. Fairness of Process Protections 
In the context of formal peer review, most lower courts are in 
accord on many of the procedural due process protections that 
should be offered a physician.122  These include the right to represen-
tation by an attorney or other person of a physician’s choice; the 
right to have a record made of the proceedings; the right to call, ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses; and, the right to present evi-
dence determined to be relevant by the hearing officer.123  These are 
basically the same rights as those enumerated in HCQIA.124  This Arti-
cle refers to these rights as ‘process protections.’ 
2. Principles Governing Fairness of Standards in General 
The lower courts also all appear to agree that the standards used 
to evaluate physician competency must be fair and not subject to ar-
bitrary or capricious application.125  Under general due process doc-
trine, for a standard to be fair, it must not be impermissibly vague.  
 
 122 See supra notes 84–92. 
 123 The question of how to decide what procedural protections are due was an-
swered in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  The Court in Mathews explained 
that 
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. at 335. 
 124 See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
 125 See supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text.  Some states hold that “the ex-
clusion of a physician from staff privileges at a private hospital is a matter which will 
ordinarily rest within the discretion of the hospital’s administrative authorities and is 
not subject to judicial review.”  Scappatura v. Baptist Hosp. of Phoenix, 584 P.2d 
1195, 1199 (Ariz. 1978); see also Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 144 A.2d 341, 343–44 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1958).  For other cases, see also Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Exclusion of 
or Discrimination Against Physician or Surgeon by Hospital, 28 A.L.R. 5th 107 (1995).  
However, these hospitals commonly limit their own discretion by stating in either 
their constitution, by-laws, rules, or regulations that the hospital may not act in an 
arbitrary or capricious fashion.  Thus, even in these hospitals, the standard used to 
evaluate physician competence must be fair and not subject to arbitrary or capricious 
application.  See, e.g., Scappatura, 584 P.2d at 1199 (judicial review to determine if 
hospital rule was reasonable and not arbitrary).  On the other hand, “‘California 
courts have long recognized a common law right to fair procedure protecting indi-
viduals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from private organizations which con-
trol important economic interests.’  Such a private organization’s actions must be 
both substantively rational and procedurally fair.”  Rosenblit, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (ci-
tations omitted). 
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While acquiescing in principle to subscribe to due process/funda- 
mental fairness protections, the lower courts are split on their will-
ingness to strike down remarkably vague standards that clearly fail 
both to provide adequate notice to physicians and to restrict the dis-
cretion of the administrative decision-makers. 
Under the vagueness doctrine, it has long been recognized that 
“a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
essential of due process of law.”126  In the context of a medical admin-
istrative proceeding like peer review,127 the vagueness doctrine is not 
 
 126 Connally v Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983).  While more commonly seen in the areas of arbi-
trary encroachments on fundamental liberty interests or First Amendment rights, 
this basic precept is equally applicable to the civil enforcement of regulations of eco-
nomic and professional activity.  Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 970 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357–58; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733, 756 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.10 (1974); Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).  “As the Court held long ago, the requirement of fair 
warning does not prohibit particular types of penalties but rather ‘exaction of obedi-
ence to a rule or standard which [is] so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or 
standard at all.’”  Whisenhunt, 464 U.S. at 970 (alteration in original) (quoting A.B. 
Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925)). 
 127 In the context of public hospitals, counties, cities, or towns are commonly 
given the authority by state statute to establish and regulate hospitals.  26 AM. JUR. 
Hospitals and Asylums §§ 3–5, at 588–90 (1952).  See, e.g., Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. of Mary 
Francis Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1966).  Those same statutes pro-
vide that the county, city, or town may, by ordinance, provide for the election of hos-
pital trustees and the transfer of the responsibility for the operation of a city or town 
hospital to this board of trustees.  Id. at 287–88; 26 AM. JUR. Hospitals and Asylums, su-
pra, §8, at 592.  “The board then becomes the local body charged with the responsi-
bility of legislating on this local issue.”  Koelling, 146 N.W.2d at 288.  The board may 
then prescribe reasonable rules that govern staff privileges.  Id. at 290.  As the board 
is a state administrative agency, the policies and procedures of general administrative 
law apply to the board of trustees as it acts in both its rule-making and adjudicative 
roles.  See, e.g., Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1984) (referring to 
peer review in state hospital as an administrative hearing); Branch v. Hempstead 
County Mem’l Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 908, 910 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (a peer review hearing 
at a county hospital was governed by the same rules and statutes governing adminis-
trative proceedings).  In the context of private hospitals, courts have treated peer re-
view as an administrative proceeding.  In Balkissoon v. Capitol Hill Hospital, 558 A.2d 
304 (D.C. 1989), the court explained that: 
The actions of hospitals in regard to staff privileges can be analogized 
to administrative agencies.  “[B]oth the administrative agency and the 
hospital board of trustees do exercise discretion and bring expertise to 
their respective tasks.  Both must also pay due respect to procedural 
safeguards whether because of constitutional due process or funda-
mental fairness.” 
Id. at 308 n.8 (alteration in original) (citing Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dis-
pensary, 401 A.2d 533, 537–38 (N.J. 1979)).  See also Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & 
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being used to challenge an ill-defined statute; instead, the challenge 
is against the hospital “for its failure to render a vague [standard] 
more specific by implementing it through rules.”128  Thus, fairness in 
this civil context refers to actions taken “according to known stan-
dards that are impartially applied through revealed procedures.”129 
In administrative law, clearly articulated ‘standing rules’ are an 
essential ingredient of fair notice as “[k]nown standards allow a per-
son to better understand what . . . [is] expect[ed] of her, so that she 
can plan her life in some forehanded way.”130  And, of equal impor-
tance, “[k]nown standards also limit the allocation choices of . . . offi-
cials.  They require that choices be made according to principle 
rather than the preference of the official.”131  The absence of clearly 
articulated standards that are capable of objective application creates 
an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.  As 
Justice Brennan explained: 
By demanding that government articulate its aims with a reason-
able degree of clarity, the Due Process Clause ensures that state 
power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting a con-
scious choice among competing social values; reduces the danger 
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws; 
and permits meaningful judicial review of state actions.132 
 
Homes Soc’y of Am., Inc., 609 P.2d 24, 28 (Alaska 1980) (via stipulation of the par-
ties, the decision made pursuant to the peer review process “should be treated as an 
administrative decision and . . . the review of that decision should be treated as a re-
view of an administrative proceeding”). 
 128 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 117, § 3.3, at 72. 
 129 Id., § 7.6.1, at 170. 
 130 Id.  See also White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) (“The re-
quirements of due process include a determination of the issues according to articu-
lated standards.”); Mayer v. Wing, 922 F. Supp. 902, 910–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (a regu-
lation that allowed for termination of in-home health care benefits when it was 
‘inappropriate’ allowed for arbitrary decision-making in violation of procedural due 
process as “[d]ue process demands that decisions regarding entitlements to govern-
ment benefits be made according to ‘ascertainable standards’”); Harnett v. Bd. of 
Zoning, Subdivision, and Building Appeals, 350 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (D.V.I. 1972) 
(“There is a tendency for regulatory systems which operate without clearly enunci-
ated standards to be inherently irrational and arbitrary.”). 
 131 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 117, § 7.6.1, at 170–71.  As Professor Lon Fuller 
observed, “[t]he first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules.”  LON L. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW 46 (rev. ed. 1969) (1964). 
 132 Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
Professors Aman and Mayton expand on this explanation with the following: 
     Using a due-process based prescription of standing rules, the courts, 
along with trying to assure evenhandedness, have also tried to assure a 
measure of stability in agency action.  They have required agencies to 
develop, codify, and publish rules so that the private sector is informed 
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For these reasons, courts have rejected assertions that “a discre-
tion to proceed by ad hoc orders rather than by rules is necessary to 
permit an agency to make decisions finely tuned to the facts and cir-
cumstances of an individual case.”133  For example, in Soglin v. Kauff-
man,134 several students were expelled by the administration of the 
University of Wisconsin which applied a ‘misconduct’ standard.  In 
finding that this standard was unconstitutionally vague, the court 
stated: 
No one disputes the power of the University to protect itself by 
means of disciplinary action against disruptive students. Power to 
punish and the rules defining the exercise of that power are not, 
however, identical.  Power alone does not supply the standards 
needed to determine its application to types of behavior or spe-
cific instances of ‘misconduct.’135 
Clearly, “[p]rocedures and hearings offer little protection without 
such rules and standards as might give content to the hearings.”136  
Or, as the Fifth Circuit has so succinctly stated, “[t]he idea of a hear-
ing is fine.  But what is to be heard?”137 
 
of what it can expect from government and manage its affairs accord-
ingly.  In this context, a requirement of rules has been described and 
applied as an aspect of a vagueness doctrine. 
     But unlike the usual vagueness doctrine case, the claim is not 
against the statute itself.  Rather, the claim is against an agency, for its 
failure to render a vague statute more specific by implementing it 
through rules. 
AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 117, § 3.3, at 72 (footnote omitted). 
 133 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 117, § 3.3, at 73.  In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 
114 (1977), the United States Supreme Court maintained that the ability of an 
agency to suspend a driver’s license by using a subjective decision-making, case-by-
case process that turned upon an “ordinary and reasonable care” standard, rather 
than objective rules, would reduce the fairness of the system.  The Court stated that 
“[t]he decision to use objective rules in this case provides drivers with more precise 
notice of what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among 
similarly situated drivers.”  Id. at 115. 
 134 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 135 Id. at 167. 
 136 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 117, § 3.3, at 73. 
 137 Block v. Thompson, 472 F.2d 587, 588 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (In the ab-
sence of specific objective criteria, after a hearing on the pros and cons of granting 
or denying a privilege, the decision-makers can “take a show of hands and then adapt 
its decision to this momentary plebiscite.”).  This query was echoed by the Seventh 
Circuit when it stated that “[t]he requirements of due process include a determina-
tion of the issues according to articulated standards.  The lack of such standards in 
this case deprives any hearing, whether before an agency or a court, of its meaning 
and value as an opportunity for the plaintiffs to prove their qualifications for assis-
tance.”  White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Raper v. Lucey, 
488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973). 
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3. Fairness of Standards in Peer Review 
The lower courts disagree over their ability to enforce this fair-
ness prescription in the context of medical peer review.  One group 
of courts found that specific criteria that can be objectively applied in 
measuring physician competence are achievable,138 while another 
found that such a task is ‘impossible.’139 
a. Fair Notice 
The courts’ opinions in Kiester v. Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc.140 
and Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital District141 exemplify the position that 
clearly articulated standards are possible.142  The Supreme Court of 
Alaska in Kiester focused on the requirement that a physician be given 
fair notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to refute 
 
 138 See, e.g., Kiester v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 843 P.2d 1219, 1225–26 (Alaska 
1992).  See also, e.g., Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 917 (W.D. Mich. 1981) 
(holding that rules established by hospitals to regulate the conduct of doctors must 
be capable of objective application); Miller v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 614 P.2d 258, 
265 (Cal. 1980) (finding that rules governing the admission of physicians cannot 
stand if the standard is “unreasonably susceptible of arbitrary or discriminatory ap-
plication”); Martino v. Concord Cmty. Hosp. Dist., 43 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (Ct. App. 
1965) (stating a hospital must set up standards which are clear, not vague, ambigu-
ous or uncertain); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 345 P.2d 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959) (noting that the standard set up was so vague and uncertain “that admission to 
the staff can depend on the whim and caprice of the directors”). 
 139 See infra note 157. 
 140 843 P.2d 1219 (Alaska 1992). 
 141 345 P.2d 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 142 Another example is the situation in Martino v. Concord Community Hospital Dis-
trict, 43 Cal. Rptr. 255, 259 (Ct. App. 1965).  In Martino, only those physicians who 
were competent to provide “the best possible care and professional skill” to patients 
were permitted on the hospital staff.  The hospital committee charged with making 
this evaluation was given the authority to conduct a hearing and give “‘such tests, oral 
and written, as the Credentials Committee shall in its discretion determine.’”  Id. at 
256.  The court found that this authority gave the committee “a broad and virtually 
unfettered discretion to subject an applicant to written and oral tests designed to ex-
plore every phase of his professional ability, training and experience” and “author-
ize[d] the credentials committee to require that an applicant take tests covering far 
more than his competence in his own particular field of medicine.” Id. at 259–60.  
“In determining what tests to require of an applicant and, again, in determining 
whether an applicant has successfully passed whatever tests it may have required, the 
credentials committee has no standards to guide it except that it shall admit to staff 
membership physicians who will provide patients with ‘the best possible care and 
professional skill’ . . . .”  Id. at 259–60.  The court held that this “vague and ambigu-
ous language” did not furnish the committee with adequate standards.  Id. at 260.  
The Martino court cited Rosner v. Eden Township Hospital District, 375 P.2d 431 (Cal. 
1962), for the proposition that a hospital district should not be permitted to adopt 
standards for the exclusion of doctors from the use of its hospital that are “so vague 
and ambiguous as to provide a substantial danger of arbitrary discrimination in its 
application.”  Martino, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (citing Rosner, 375 P.2d at 435). 
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them.  In Kiester, the hospital based its decision to deny staff privileges 
on oral evaluations of the physician’s medical competence that con-
cluded that the physician “lacked sufficient medical knowledge.”143  
On appeal, the court explained that the “basic principles of due 
process of law require that criteria established for granting or deny-
ing privileges not be vague and ambiguous, and that as established, 
they be applied objectively.”144  The court went on to hold that “basic 
principles of due process of law require that when a hospital denies 
an application for privileges, it notifies the applicant of the specific 
criteria which were determinative in the denial and how the applicant 
failed to meet the hospital’s expectations with regard to the crite-
ria.”145  The court held that the oral examinations violated due proc-
ess in that 
none of the evaluations establish the level of [medical] knowledge 
which would be of “sufficient adequacy” or the criteria used to 
evaluate sufficiency. . . . nor does it attempt to quantify in any way 
the extent to which an applicant must answer in a satisfactory 
manner in order to meet standards of training and education or 
demonstrated competence.  Absent such notice, it is impossible 
for any reviewing body to objectively and independently deter-
mine if an applicant has established “competence.”146 
Consequently, according to the Kiester view, in order to establish ade-
quate notice, the hospital must identify both the objective criteria 
that the physician has violated and the manner in which the physi-
cian violated the criteria.147  Both the criteria used to judge compe-
tency and the violations should be identified with sufficient clarity to 
allow the physician to prepare a full and fair defense against the 
claims of the hospital.148 
 
 143 Kiester, 843 P.2d at 1226. 
 144 Id. at 1225. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1226 (footnote omitted).  See also Martino, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 259–60. 
 147 Kiester, 843 P.2d at 1225.  See also Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 
401 A.2d 533 (N.J. 1979): 
     Fundamental fairness dictates that the hospital apprise the physician 
of the specific charges and that the applicant be afforded the opportu-
nity to appear and present witnesses and material in support of his po-
sition and to contradict or explain the bases asserted for the proposed 
denial.  Such hearings in addition to affording the doctor an opportu-
nity to respond to charges enable a hospital to make “an intelligent 
and reasonable judgment in good faith upon all the facts presented.” 
Id. at 541 (quoting Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass’n, 231 A.2d 389, 393 (N.J. Super. 
1967)). 
 148 Christenson v Mount Carmel Health, 678 N.E.2d 255, 262–63 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1996); but see Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 1987) (physician was 
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Under HCQIA, in order for the participants in the peer review 
process to be granted immunity, the physician must have received 
adequate notice.  Specifically, HCQIA requires that the physician be 
told the “reasons for the proposed action.”149  Applying the Kiester ra-
tionale that describes the key elements of fundamentally fair pro-
ceedings, when the hospital supplies the “reasons for the proposed 
action” under HCQIA, the hospital must identify both the objective 
criteria that the physician has violated and the manner in which the 
physician violated the criteria.  Absent these clearly articulated, objec-
tive criteria, all of the participants in the peer review process will be 
denied HCQIA immunity. 
b. Arbitrary and Capricious Application 
Alternatively, the California Court of Appeal in Wyatt focused on 
the failure of a standard to provide any restrictions on the discretion 
of the hospital’s directors.  In Wyatt, only physicians and surgeons 
who, in the judgment of the board, would provide the “best possible 
care and professional skill” were granted staff privileges.150  The court 
quizzically asked: “What is the best possible care and professional 
skill?  Would it limit the practice of medicine in the Tahoe District 
Hospital to physicians and surgeons who are recognized authorities 
in their respective fields?”151  The court concluded: 
The standard set up is such that admission to the staff can depend 
on the whim and caprice of the directors.  A hospital district in 
the exercise of its duty to prescribe reasonable rules and regula-
tions must set up standards or qualifications for those who wish to 
serve in the hospital which are general but not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. . . . The rule enacted by the board of directors of re-
spondent hospital does not meet this test and as such may not be 
used to exclude appellant.152 
While concluding that the standards used in the peer review proceed-
ings by the hospitals in Kiester and Wyatt were impermissibly vague, 
these courts did not give any guidance on how to create clearly articu-
 
barred from representation by a lawyer, was not presented with an opportunity to 
produce witnesses on his behalf, was charged with conduct when the same conduct 
had been part of prior hearings where he was exonerated and was not presented with 
a written decision setting forth the findings of the peer review panel, all under a 
process with no written guidelines or standards). 
 149 42 U.S.C. §11112(b)(1) (2000). 
 150 Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 345 P.2d 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. (citation omitted). 
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lated standards.  Is the creation of such standards possible?  Many 
courts answer this question in the negative.153 
c. Feasibility of Clearly Articulated Standards 
Representative of those courts which take the position that it is 
not possible, or desirable, to create clearly articulated standards to 
evaluate physician competence is the case of Jackson v. Fulton-DeKalb 
Hospital Authority.154  In Jackson, a physician appealed the suspension 
of his surgical privileges which were found by the hospital to be “‘det-
rimental to the maintenance of proper standards of medical care.’”155  
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
upheld the suspension in the face of a challenge that the standard 
was “impermissibly vague and arbitrary.”156  In doing so, the court 
threw up its hands in defeat, thereby abdicating its obligation to en-
sure that the peer review process conforms to basic principles of fair-
ness: 
“[I]n the area of personal fitness for medical staff privileges pre-
cise standards are difficult if not impossible to articulate. . . . The 
subjectives of selection simply cannot be minutely codified.  The 
governing board of a hospital must therefore be given great lati-
tude in prescribing the necessary qualifications for potential ap-
plicants.”157 
 
 153 See infra notes 154–60 and accompanying text. 
 154 423 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1976); see also Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass’n, 
523 F.2d 56, 59–60 (8th Cir. 1975) (hearing panel terminated staff privileges finding 
that the surgeon failed to exercise the degree of care and skill that a reasonably care-
ful and skilled surgeon would have exercised and failed to possess the degree of care 
and skill ordinarily possessed by reasonably skilled surgeons). 
 155 Jackson, 423 F. Supp. at 1005 (emphasis added); see also Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Mary Francis Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1966) (failure to provide 
“adequate medical care” as judged by an in-house standard). 
 156 Jackson, 423 F. Supp. at 1005; see also Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 
1192–94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding, in peer review matter where physician’s staff 
privileges were terminated for providing “inadequate care” or care that fell “‘below 
that which should be acceptable in any hospital,’” that notice to the physician was 
not vague as the charges were sufficiently precise). 
 157 Jackson, 423 F. Supp. at 1005 (quoting Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of the Val Verde 
Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1971)).  It is interesting that the Jackson 
court took this quote directly from the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Sosa.  In Sosa, a phy-
sician was denied privileges based on his character.  The hospital’s position was that 
the physician had an inability to work well with others and had questionable ethics.  
437 F.2d at 175.  In this context, the court of appeals stated that “standards such as 
‘character qualifications and standing’ are very general, but this court recognizes 
that in the area of personal fitness for medical staff privileges precise standards are diffi-
cult if not impossible to articulate.”  Id. at 176 (emphasis added).  This finding, made 
in the context of personal character fitness, was then grafted into subsequent court 
opinions, such as the one in Jackson, dealing with the measure of competency of the 
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The court went on to explain this relinquishment, maintaining that 
broad standards are preferable in that a “‘[d]etailed description of 
prohibited conduct is concededly impossible, perhaps even undesir-
able, in view of rapidly shifting standards of medical excellence and 
the fact that a human life may be and quite often is involved in the 
ultimate decision of the board.’”158 
The reasoning of the Jackson opinion illustrates the perspective 
of courts which generally acknowledge the inherent unfairness of ap-
 
medical care for patients.  None of the reasoning of the courts in this line of cases 
accounts for the leap in application of this ‘impossibility’ conclusion from character 
fitness situations to the measurement of competence in the provision of medical 
care. 
 158 Jackson, 423 F. Supp. at 1005–06 (quoting N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 
So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1962)).  In North Broward, the hospital’s Board of Commissioners 
terminated staff privileges under a by-law giving it “‘the right to remove any member 
of the medical staff or to deprive any physician or surgeon of the privileges of the 
hospital whenever in their sole judgment the good of the hospital or the patients 
therein may demand it.’”  North Broward, 148 So. 2d. at 2.  The court found that this 
broad discretion was warranted, stating that “[a]n exception from the strict require-
ments of legislative prescription is often recognized in the area of determination of 
personal fitness.”  Id. at 5. 
Another line of cases dealing with medical licensure arguably follows this ration-
ale.  For example, in Braun v. Board of Dental Examiners, 702 A.2d 124 (Vt. 1997), the 
Vermont Supreme Court upheld a vagueness challenge by a dentist who was disci-
plined under a Vermont statute for a “gross failure to uphold the standard of care.”  
Id. at 129.  The conduct at issue was the delegation of the diagnosis of a patient’s 
condition to a dental assistant by the dentist.  Id. at 126.  The court explained its po-
sition by stating that: 
[I]t is not necessary, or possible, for a statute that regulates a profes-
sional field to detail each and every act that is prohibited. 
     [A]ny board or body whose duty it is to pass upon the qualifications 
of licenses of the various professions . . . must do so by applying some 
broad and necessarily general standards. 
Id. at 129 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).  However, in 
Braun, the broad “gross failure” licensure standard was saved by the fact that it was 
given definition by a separate state standard of care statute that expressly prohibited 
the delegation of diagnosis to a dental assistant.  Id. at 127. 
The licensure situation can be distinguished from peer review.  In comparison 
to peer review, in cases involving licensure, the risk to fairness is posed more by no-
tice problems than by arbitrary and capricious decision-making.  In peer review, the 
risk to fairness is posed by both of these vagueness concerns equally.  For example, 
the decision-makers in licensure cases are administrative officials who are most likely 
to have had little to no prior dealings or involvement with the targeted physician.  
With peer review, the likelihood that the decision-makers have had, and currently 
have, both personal and economic dealings with the targeted physician are high.  
Thus, in peer review, the risk to fairness is posed by both notice and arbitrary capri-
ciousness concerns.  Other conflicts of interests, such as a desire to conform to the 
wishes of the executive committee, or other powerful members of the hospital staff, 
to terminate the targeted physician may be at play.  While vagueness concerns are 
important in both proceedings, the risks to a fair process are greater in peer review, 
requiring much greater clarity in the standards used. 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
1212 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1179 
plying a broad standard of care measure, yet conclude that this un-
fairness is unavoidable as judging physician competency is a purely 
subjective exercise.159  Some courts, like the Jackson court, go so far as 
to question the advisability of even engaging in the attempt to articu-
late clear and objective criteria, finding that the establishment of ob-
jective criteria would somehow be incapable of timely revision to re-
flect scientific advancements.160  While the courts focus on the impact 
of dated standards on patient safety, this quick rate of obsolescence 
also raises the specter that judgments regarding physician compe-
tence could be based on bad data.  Thus, standards based on clear 
objective criteria, while being less vague, may well be arbitrary. 
 
 159 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Carney, 404 F. Supp. 161, 164–65 (E.D. Mo. 1975).  In Kap-
lan, the plaintiff contended that he was denied due process in a peer review proceed-
ing “because there were no guidelines or objective criteria governing the standard to 
which he was accountable.”  Id. at 164.  The standards that were used to judge the 
plaintiff’s performance included “that of acceptability in reference to the Hospital’s 
staff; the general standards of this country; the standards of the area; the standards of 
the hospital; or the standards of acceptability to the Executive Committee.”  Id.  Ap-
parently in response to the multiple standards used by the hospital, an independent 
review panel which the hospital had consulted in the case, the Health Care Founda-
tion of Missouri, Inc., recommended that “the hospital set up policies of audit and 
peer review so that there are standards of statistical validity by which a physician’s 
performance can be measured . . . standards of practice for the hospital should be 
available in written form and all physicians in the hospital measured against them.”  
Id. at 163.  In spite of the position of these physicians that clearly articulated stan-
dards were feasible, the court in Kaplan held that “[w]hile it would perhaps be ad-
vantageous to have the Hospital establish definite standards, this court is unable to 
conclude that the standards employed by defendants are so unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or capricious as to amount to a denial of due process.  Precise standards of compe-
tency would be difficult to establish . . . .”  Id. at 165.  See also Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dirs. 
of St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242, 245 (Ct. App. 1985) (opin-
ing that standard that excluded physicians from staff privileges who did not provide 
“high quality” care was not vague, as those who made the determination of whether 
the standard was met were familiar with the standard of medical care in the commu-
nity and in the hospital); Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1399–1401 (Or. 1975) 
(quoting Sosa, 437 F.2d at 176 (stating that the requirement that physicians provide a 
“high quality of medical care” is admittedly general but a more precise standard 
would be “difficult if not impossible to articulate”); Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 144 A.2d 
341, 344 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958)).  See generally Dorr, supra note 125. 
 160 Jackson, 423 F. Supp. at 1005–06.  “A ‘[d]etailed description of prohibited con-
duct is concededly impossible, perhaps even undesirable in view of rapidly shifting 
standards of medical excellence and the fact that a human life may be and quite of-
ten is involved in the ultimate decision of the board.’”  Gaenslen, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 243 
(quoting Britton v. Humphreys Mem’l Hosp., 370 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979)); see also Moore v. Bd. of Trs. of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d 605, 607–09 
(Nev. 1972) (finding that a by-law that allowed for termination for “unprofessional 
conduct” provided sufficient notice to physician and that a more detailed standard 
was unwise in light of rapidly changing standards of medicine).  It should be noted 
that this argument also cuts the other way with regard to notice to the physician. 
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Most of this group of cases hold by implication that, on balance, 
as no fair standard can be formulated, it is better to allow competent 
physicians to be unfairly denied hospital staff privileges than to allow 
potential harm to the public by unlimited access to hospitals without 
regard to clinical competence.161  One court explained this balancing 
in light of 
[a common] procedure employed for appointment whereby 
members of the Active Staff (generally older, more established 
practitioners), hold the lifeline on the younger doctors by virtue 
of the fact that their recommendation is required for appoint-
ment.  This, it is argued, grants the exclusive use of a tax sup-
ported institution to the doctors who agree among themselves 
that they are the most competent. . . . 
 On analysis, however, the suggested evils of the ‘oligarchy’ of 
the Active Staff leave less to fear than the alternative prospect of 
potential public harm arising from unlimited access to hospital 
facilities by licensed physicians without regard to clinical ability.162 
This split in the lower courts raises three questions: First, overall, 
just how vague are the standards being used in peer review to evalu-
ate clinical competence?  Second, as a policy matter, does the utiliza-
tion of these standards both properly balance the interests of the 
stakeholders and further the goals of peer review?  Finally, if the 
standards currently being used to measure clinical competence are 
impermissibly vague, improperly skew the balance between stake-
holders’ interests and fail to further the goals of peer review, is it pos-
sible to create clearly articulated standards that both properly balance 
the interests at stake and further the goals of peer review?163  The re-
mainder of this Article attempts to deal with these questions. 
 
 161 Dayan v. Wood River Twp. Hosp., 152 N.E.2d 205, 207–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958). 
 162 Id.  Another line of cases deals with contentions that the standard of measure-
ment of physician competence is impermissibly vague by relying on what appears to 
be a variation on the business judgment rule.  In Marin v. Citizens Memorial Hospital, 
700 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Tex. 1988), the targeted physician complained that there was 
no objective standard of competency for physicians at the hospital.  Id. at 359.  The 
court considered this complaint to be irrelevant, finding that “the pertinent question 
is whether the evidence relied upon by the Hospital was reasonably related to the 
operation of a hospital and its attending medical staff.”  Id. (citing Yashon v. Hunt, 
825 F.2d 1016, 1025 (6th Cir. 1987)). 
 163 These questions parallel the vagueness analysis most courts follow in the con-
text of vagueness challenges to criminal statutes.  See generally Robert Batey, Vagueness 
and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 
(1997): 
     In resolving questions under the vagueness doctrine, courts must 
first evaluate whether the allegedly deficient language raises problems 
of fair notice of the requirements of criminal law or of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement by police or prosecutors.  If there is suffi-
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VI. ‘STANDARD OF CARE’ MEASUREMENTS AND VAGUENESS  
PRINCIPLES IN PEER REVIEW 
As previously stated, the peer review process is usually triggered 
by the report of an event or series of events that raises questions 
about a physician’s clinical competence.164  The standards used to 
measure clinical competence by various hospitals across the country 
appear to fall generally into three basic categories: those which grant 
absolute discretion to the decision-makers; those which rely on cus-
tomary care as practiced in the hospital or in some broader medical 
community; and, those which rely on general negligence standards. 
The first two categories of standards act principally to broadly 
protect a hospital’s general autonomy in making staffing decisions.  
These standards are so vague that they provide little or no protection 
either to physicians’ interests in practicing their profession or to pa-
tients’ interests in choosing their own physician. 
The third category, which includes those standards which incor-
porate general negligence doctrine, is currently almost as problem-
atic.  However, these standards at least have the potential to provide 
some measure of notice to physicians and to place some limits on the 
discretion of the administrative decision-makers.  This potential de-
pends on adding a simple qualifier which pins down the locality from 
which evidence of customary care is to be drawn.  Unfortunately, un-
der the current system of evaluating physician competence, this 
modification, which enhances the protection of physicians’ interests, 
comes with the downside of negatively impacting the quality of pa-
 
cient concern on either of these fronts, a judge should balance the ne-
cessity for the ambiguous language to achieve the legislative goal against 
the chilling effect of the ambiguity on protected or desirable conduct. 
Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).  Necessity, of course, implies that alternative, more 
precise, language is not feasible.  Id. at 9.  If there is other language that both 
achieves the goals of the legislation at issue and provides greater notice and limits on 
discriminatory enforcement, the statute is not likely to pass muster.  See id.  “Courts 
and other legal analysts implicitly signal their understanding of the centrality of bal-
ancing when they speak of the tolerability of ambiguity in a particular statutory provi-
sion.  Toleration implies an acceptance of certain negative consequences because 
they are outweighed by positive ones.”  Id. at 8.  It is important to note that the sig-
nificance of the legislative goal is a factor: 
[T]here is in effect a multiplier, which increases the tolerability of ar-
guably vague language when the legislature enacted the language in 
pursuit of policies the court considers important.  Of course, this is a 
baldly political assessment, not one that judges (even elected ones) are 
expected to perform, which is likely why judges are virtually silent 
about this aspect of the weighing of necessity. 
Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). 
 164 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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tient care.  Thus, all of the types of standards used under the current 
system of evaluating physician competence fail to achieve a proper 
balance between the interests of the stakeholders in the process. 
A. Standards Granting Absolute Discretion to the Hospital 
The most obvious example of a standard that expressly vests 
complete and unfettered discretion in decision-makers is one which 
gives a hospital’s governing body “‘the right to remove any member 
of the medical staff or to deprive any physician or surgeon of the 
privileges of the hospital whenever in their sole judgment the good of 
the hospital or the patients therein may demand it.’”165  Also included 
in this category are those by-laws which are less blatant but, in appli-
cation, still call for a purely subjective determination.  These stan-
dards define the required level of competence as that which the deci-
sion-makers determine is the “best possible care,”166 or “adequate 
medical care”167 or “high quality medical care.”168 
None of the standards in this category contain any limits on the 
discretion of decision-makers.  Nor do they provide any notice to 
physicians of what conduct will satisfy or violate the competency re-
quirement.169  This allows the administrative decision-makers the 
flexibility to define incompetence in a ‘we know it when we see it’ 
 
 165 N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 2–5 (Fla. 1962); see also Tasher v. 
St. Tammany Parish Hosp., No. 87-1139, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1018, *5 (E.D. La. 
1988) (executive committee had complete discretion to summarily suspend privi-
leges “‘whenever action must be taken immediately in the best interest of patient 
care in the hospital’”; this same broad standard was applied at the post-deprivation 
hearing). 
 166 Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 345 P.2d 93, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (only 
physicians and surgeons who, in the judgment of the board, would provide the “best 
possible care and professional skill” were granted staff privileges); see also Duby v. 
Jordan Hosp., 341 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Mass. 1976) (hospital, “in judging the [physi-
cian’s] professional competence[,] required that he give his patients the ‘best possi-
ble care’”); Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1399 (Or. 1975) (physician must pro-
vide to patients “a high quality of medical care”). 
 167 Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. of Mary Francis Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W. 2d 284, 
296–97 (Iowa 1966) (failure to provide ‘adequate’ medical care); see also Bock v. John 
C. Lincoln Hosp., 702 P.2d 253, 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (physician’s staff privileges 
were terminated because Executive Committee determined that the physician 
“‘failed to demonstrate to the Medical Committee that [he was] qualified to practice 
as an Internal Medicine specialist.’”). 
 168 Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dir. of St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 
(Ct. App. 1985) (standard that excluded physicians from staff privileges who did not 
provide “high quality” care); Huffaker, 540 P.2d at 1399–401 (requirement that physi-
cians provide a “high quality of medical care”). 
 169 See Moore v. Bd. of Trs. of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d 605, 607–09 (Nev. 
1972) (by-law that allowed for termination for “unprofessional conduct”). 
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fashion, creating the real possibility that the standard could be a mov-
ing target, varying with the make-up of the deciding body.  The list of 
process protections that most hospitals now provide and are required 
under HCQIA, such as a hearing and the right to counsel,170 are all 
empty formalities if, after the proceedings are completed, the deci-
sion-makers can decide to take whatever action their personal inclina-
tions dictate.  Physicians’ interests in the ability to practice their pro-
fession and patients’ interests in choosing their own physicians find 
little to no protection in these standards.  Thus, the standards which 
fall into this category appear to be vague on their face. 
This type of broad standard also creates the greatest risk that de-
cisions to exclude certain physicians could be made based on reasons 
having nothing to do with the interests of patient safety.171  These rea-
sons could be economic,172 personal dislike,173 or discriminatory in na-
ture.174  The immunity protections put into place by both HCQIA and 
state immunity legislation result in a loss of access to the judicial sys-
tem by these aggrieved physicians.  If peer review is being used for 
purposes unrelated to quality of care, then this loss of legal recourse 
is unjustified. 
Tying into this consideration is the fact that these vague stan-
dards raise questions about the meaningfulness of judicial review.  As 
the court in Kiester described, absent clearly articulated criteria, “it is 
impossible for any reviewing body to objectively and independently 
determine if an applicant has established ‘competence.’”175  Thus, 
courts will be unable to determine if the peer review result was driven 
by considerations unrelated to the quality of patient care. 
 
 170 See supra Part IV. 
 171 As HCQIA immunity was put into place to encourage peer review that en-
hanced the quality of patient care while at the same time protecting physicians’ in-
terests, it is questionable whether peer review proceedings that act merely to protect 
hospital autonomy in decision-making should enjoy HCQIA protections.  This type 
of standard coupled with HCQIA immunity unjustifiably cuts off a physician’s ability 
to challenge staffing decisions unrelated to quality of care concerns through a judi-
cial appeal. 
 172 See generally John D. Blum, Economic Credentialing: A New Twist in Hospital Ap-
praisal Process, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 427 (1991); John D. Blum, Hospital-Medical Staff Rela-
tions in the Face of Shifting Institutional Business Strategies, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
561 (1991); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to 
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988); Judith E. Orie, Economic 
Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 437 (1998). 
 173 See generally PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 60, at app. B. 
 174 See, e.g., id., at app. A. 
 175 Kiester v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 843 P. 2d 1219, 1226 (Alaska 1992). 
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B. In-House Standards 
The second category includes what this Article refers to as ‘in-
house’ standards. Examples that fall into this category include hold-
ing physicians to a standard of care as measured by the “[hospital’s] 
standard of competence”176 or the “standard of the hospital or the 
medical staff”177 or “the general standards of the surgical commit-
tee.”178  These standards are referred to as ‘in-house’ standards as one 
interpretation is that these standards refer to the standard of care 
that is practiced within the hospital itself.  Another interpretation is 
that these standards give the medical staff or hospital the freedom to 
choose a standard of care from among those practiced by the general 
medical community outside the hospital.  While both interpretations 
bring their own unique set of problems to peer review, both contain 
the same flawed reliance upon customary care as a marker for quality 
patient care. 
1. Problems with the Customary Care Measurement of 
Physician Competence 
Generally, when a physician is referring to the standard of care 
for a particular condition under a particular set of circumstances, the 
physician is referring to that care which would customarily be given 
by other physicians under the same or similar circumstances.  Based 
on this customary care referent, an argument could be made that the 
standards which fall into this category provide greater clarity, and 
therefore, greater notice to physicians of what conduct is sanction-
able.  In addition, this clarity arguably brings with it a greater limita-
tion on the decision-makers’ ability to terminate staff privileges based 
on personal predilections unrelated to the quality of patient care.  
These arguments are based on two highly questionable presump-
 
 176 Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill. 1989) 
(physician’s treatment of patients failed to conform to “the Center’s standard of 
competence”). 
 177 Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 1977) (corrective 
action appropriate when “professional conduct of any member of the staff shall be 
considered to be lower than the standard of the hospital or the medical staff . . . .”); 
see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 242, at 633 (1st ed. 2000). 
 178 Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246, 248–49,  (Ct. App. 
1988) (Newly minted surgeon who had excellent credentials and training evaluations 
during his residency ran afoul of a group of surgeons in the hospital where he 
started his practice.  Members of this group of physicians both served on the peer 
review panels charged with judging whether the new surgeon met this in-house stan-
dard and testified that the new surgeon “did not ‘meet the general standards of the 
surgical community at El Camino Hospital . . . .’”). 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
1218 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1179 
tions.  First, they presume that there are standards of care for the di-
agnosis and treatment of medical conditions that are commonly 
known, and agreed upon, in the medical community.  Second, they 
presume that adherence to these customs does in fact further the 
quality of patient care. 
However, numerous studies raise serious questions regarding the 
existence of knowable ‘customary care’ for many medical condi-
tions.179  Other studies point out that, to the extent some customary 
care exists, many of those customs have been detrimental to the qual-
ity of patient care.180  Finally, a whole body of scientific evidence con-
cludes that the rate of physician agreement on what care actually is 
quality patient care is only slightly above that which would be ex-
pected from chance.181 
a. The Fiction of Customary Medical Care 
A series of startling scientific studies raises the question of 
whether the concept of ‘customary care’ is, in fact, a fiction.182  These 
studies reveal striking and unjustifiable variations in the choices that 
physicians made in the diagnosis and treatment of the same clinical 
condition.183  These variations were observed both between regions, 
and, in some cases, between providers in the same locale.184  “This ob-
served variation in practice approaches implies either that practitio-
ners do not really know what works in medicine and, so, are just ‘fir-
 
 179 See infra notes 182–87 and accompanying text. 
 180 See infra notes 188–96 and accompanying text. 
 181 See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 182 Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician 
Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87, 88 [hereinafter Havighurst, 
Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards]. 
 183 Mark A. Hall & Michael D. Green, Introduction, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 
670–71 (2002) (citing Bruce E. Landon et al., Personal, Organizational, and Market 
Level Influences on Physician Practice Patterns: Results of a National Survey of Primary Care 
Physicians, 39 MED. CARE 889, 889 (2001) (failing to find, through the use of clinical 
vignettes, any evidence of “a consistent practice style” for certain common discre-
tionary medical decisions)). 
 184 See generally Mark R. Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical 
Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285, 287 (1986) (measuring 
variation in rates of use by Medicare beneficiaries); David M. Eddy, Variations in Phy-
sician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at 74, 77–80 (detailing 
physician variations in choice of diagnosis and of procedure); John E. Wennberg, 
Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal For Action, HEALTH AFF., Summer 
1984, at 6, 7 (variations in surgical procedures and medical treatments were docu-
mented); John E. Wennberg et al., Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-
Induced Demand, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 811, 812–17 (1982) (detailing differences in surgi-
cal practices); John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care 
Delivery, 182 SCI. 1102 (1973). 
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ing blind,’ or else that some do know what works and are doing it 
right while others, for some reason, are not.”185  For example, 
in Maine, by the time women reach seventy years of age in one 
hospital market the likelihood they have undergone a hysterec-
tomy is 20 percent while in another market [it] is 70 percent.  In 
Iowa, the chances that male residents who reach age eighty five 
have undergone prostatectomy range from a low of 15 percent to 
a high of more than 60 percent in different hospital markets.  In 
Vermont the probability that resident children will undergo a 
tonsillectomy has ranged from a low of 8 percent in one hospital 
market to a high of 70 percent in another.186 
Thus, “to ask an expert . . . what the ‘customary practice’ is [for a par-
ticular condition] on a national basis . . . is to ask a question to which 
there cannot be, for many diagnosis and treatment decisions, a co-
herent answer.”187 
The most recent studies describing the disparity in treatment 
choices for the same condition between physicians are based on data 
collected in 2004.188  This data shows that doctors and hospitals “fail 
with alarming frequency to deliver essential life-saving treatments for 
some of the most common causes of death—heart attack, pneumonia 
 
 185 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 
HEALTH MATRIX 369, 371 (1995); see also Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Stan-
dards, supra note 182, at 89 (“These revelations undermined one of the crucial prem-
ises on which the health care industry has long operated—namely, the assumption 
that, by and large, individual physicians are guided by medical science and the norms 
and standards of their profession to pursue appropriate courses of diagnosis and 
treatment.”). 
 186 Wennberg, supra note 184, at 9. 
 187 James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing In Assuring 
Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality In The Health Care Mar-
ketplace, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 137 (2002). 
 188 Ford Fessenden, It’s the Simple Things, but Some Hospitals Don’t Do Them, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 4, at 43. This study was made possible by section 501(b) of 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
(“MMA”).  Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (to be codified in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).  Under the MMA,  
[b]eginning with discharges in 2004, eligible acute care hospitals could 
elect to report quality data in order to receive the incentive payment 
established by [MMA].  To obtain increased payment, the provision re-
quires eligible hospitals to report on an initial set of 10 quality per-
formance measures . . . and to agree to have their data publicly dis-
played. 
United States Department of Health & Human Services, Hospitals Compare, 
http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/Hospital/Static/Data-Professionals.asp [here-
inafter Hospital Quality Alliance Project], (last visited Apr. 29, 2006).  This project is 
called the Hospital Quality Alliance Project.  Id. 
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and heart failure . . . .”189  For example, patients who are given aspirin 
within the first twenty-four hours after a heart attack may have up to a 
thirty percent increase in the rate of survival.190  However, of 3500 
hospitals studied, physicians in those hospitals failed to give aspirin to 
one out of every sixteen patients.191  In 2004, a total of 12,000 patients 
in these hospitals alone did not receive this simple life-saving treat-
ment.192  The report shows there is a wide variation, from state to 
state, from hospital to hospital and from physician to physician within 
the same hospital, in whether it is customary to provide this life sav-
ing treatment or whether it is customary not to provide the treat-
ment.193  For example, the data showed that the hospitals studied in 
Massachusetts provided this treatment ninety-seven percent of the 
time,194 whereas the hospitals in Arkansas provided the treatment only 
eighty-five percent of the time.195  In most states, some hospitals pro-
vided the treatment one-hundred percent of the time, while other 
hospitals in the same community provided it only fifty percent of the 
time.196 
This body of research undermines the position that the term 
‘standard of care’ is given clarity by reference to customs that are 
generally known, and agreed upon, in the medical profession. 
b. Customary Care: An Appropriate Quality Measure? 
In addition to the studies that question the existence of known 
customs, a separate line of studies reveals “serious weaknesses in the 
scientific underpinnings of many customary practices”197 and the 
 
 189 Fessenden, supra note 188 (citing Hospital Quality Alliance Project). 
 190 Id.   
The heart is a muscle that gets oxygen through blood vessels.  Some-
times blood clots can block these blood vessels, and the heart can’t get 
enough oxygen.  This can cause a heart attack.  Chewing an aspirin as 
soon as symptoms of a heart attack begin may help reduce the severity 
of the attack.   
Hospital St. Luke’s Hospital, Reports on Patient Care Quality – Heart Attack Core 
Measures, http://www.stlukes-stl.com/patient_care/chart_heart_attack.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2006). 
 191 Fessenden, supra note 188. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 88–89 & n.6 
(citing, for example, David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: 
Implications for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19, 20 (“[F]or at least 
some important practices, the existing evidence is of such poor quality that it is virtu-
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“substantial overuse of many medical and surgical procedures.”198  For 
example, the use of certain respiratory techniques and gastric freez-
ing of ulcers, which were quickly adopted as ‘standard practice,’ were 
ultimately discredited by scientific studies.199  In addition, there are 
wide variations in the use of “laboratory tests, prescription drugs, X-
rays, return appointments, and telephone consultations among simi-
larly trained doctors in a wide variety of practice settings.  Research 
on appropriateness indicates that from one quarter to one third of 
medical services may be of no value to patients.”200 
For example, one study on the insertion of pacemakers in a 
large group of individuals indicated that “44% of the implants were 
definitely indicated, 36% possibly indicated, and 20% were not indi-
cated.”201  Another example is a study which demonstrated that ca-
rotid endarterectomies, which remove blood clots in the arteries lead-
ing to the brain, were only indicated in thirty-two percent of the cases 
reviewed.202 
c. Level of Physician Agreement on Quality Patient Care 
Compounding this problem is a series of studies conducted in 
the 1990s which concluded that “physician agreement regarding 
quality of care is only slightly better than the level expected by 
 
ally impossible to determine even what effect the practice has on patients, much less 
whether that effect is preferable to the outcomes that would have occurred with 
other options.”); David M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 343, 343 (1982) (“[T]here is reason to believe that there are flaws 
in the process by which the profession generates clinical policies.” (alteration in 
original))). 
 198 Id. at 88–89 & n.7 (quoting Robert Brook et al., Predicting the Appropriate Use of 
Carotid Endarterectomy, Upper Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, and Coronary Angiography, 323 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1173 (1990) (“‘[W]e concluded that 17 percent of coronary 
angiographies, 17 percent of endoscopies, and 32 percent of endarterectomies rep-
resented inappropriate overuse [using a liberal standard].’” (alterations in origi-
nal))). 
 199 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 33 (5th 
ed. 2001) [hereinafter FURROW ET AL., CASEBOOK]. 
 200 Id. at 34 (citing Robert Brook & Kathleen Lohr, Will We Need To Ration Effective 
Medical Care?, ISSUES IN SCI.  & TECH., Fall 1986, at 68.  Another study found a “seven-
teen-fold variation in lab use among internists dealing with clinical patients.”  
FURROW ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 199, at 34 (citing Steven A. Schroeder et al., Use 
of Laboratory Tests and Pharmaceutical Variation Among Physicians and Effect of Cost Audit 
on Subsequent Use, 225 J. AM. MED.  ASS’N 969 (1973)). 
 201 FURROW ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 199, at 34 (citing Lee Goldman et al., 
Costs and Effectiveness of Routine Therapy with Long-Term Beta-Adrenergic Antagonists After 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, 319 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 52 (1988)). 
 202 Mark R. Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations In The 
Use Of Health Care Services? A Study Of Three Procedures, 258 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2533, 
2533–37 (1987). 
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chance.”203  The conclusions drawn by these studies are not surprising 
in light of the remarkably wide variation in practices utilized by phy-
sicians evidenced by the studies described in the prior sections. 
These studies on the variation and effectiveness of customary 
treatment and the very low level of agreement among physicians re-
garding what care is quality care, raise serious questions regarding 
the appropriateness of the use of customary care as evidence of phy-
sician competence. 
2. In-House Standards in Peer Review: Internal Customs 
Over and above the questions regarding the use of customary 
care as a measurement of physician competence are the problems as-
sociated with applying an in-house measurement in peer review.  
Many of these problems can be identified by the lessons learned by 
the use of customary care evidence in medical malpractice litigation. 
In a medical malpractice case, in order to meet the ‘standard of 
care,’ a physician must “possess and use the care, skill and knowledge 
ordinarily possessed and used under like circumstances . . . .”204  The 
majority rule is that conclusive evidence205 of this failure occurs when 
the physician does not take the same actions customarily taken by 
other physicians in similar circumstances.206  The medical malpractice 
law of the different states varies with regard to the locality from which 
they draw their customary practices.  States have chosen to apply the 
customs followed by the practitioners in the local community under 
the “same locality rule”207 or another community under the “similar 
 
 203 Ronald L. Goldman, The Reliability of Peer Assessments of Quality of Care, 267 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 958, 958 (1992); Rodney Hayward et al., Evaluating the Care Of General 
Medicine Inpatients: How Good Is Implicit Review?, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 550, 550 
(1993); Haya R. Rubin et al., Watching the Doctor Watchers: How Well Do Peer Review Or-
ganization Methods Detect Hospital Care Quality Problems, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2349, 
2349 (1992). 
 204 Burns v. Metz, 513 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Neb. 1994); Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 
185, 188 (Ind. 1992) (judging the physician’s conduct by a “‘minimum standard of 
care for the particular practice’”).  For an excellent overview of medical malpractice 
law, see DOBBS, supra note 177, § 243, at 634–35. 
 205 See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury In Modern Malpractice Law, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 909 (2002) (discussing the merits of the role of custom as conclusive 
evidence of the standard of care in malpractice litigation and the movement by many 
states to use custom as only some evidence of the standard of care). 
 206 See DOBBS, supra note 177, § 243, at 634. 
 207 See infra notes 210–16 and accompanying text.  DOBBS, supra note 177, § 244, at 
636 (citing Trindle v. Wheeler, 143 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1943); Morris v. Thompson, 937 
P.2d 1212 (Idaho 1997)).  See Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880) (original case 
finding that the locality rule applied in a medical malpractice action); see also Branch 
v. Hempstead County Mem’l Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 908, 919 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (Only 
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community” rule,208 or customary care on a national level under the 
“national rule.”209  However, over time, a large number of states210 
have chosen to abandon the locality rule in the context of medical 
malpractice litigation. 
 Because of both the reluctance of physicians from the same 
community to testify against one another and the possibility that 
the physicians in a particular community will establish a substan-
dard degree of care and skill, many jurisdictions have expanded 
the “same locality” rule by requiring a general practitioner to pos-
sess and exercise the degree of care and skill normally employed 
in similar circumstances by physicians in good standing in the 
same, or a similar, locality.211 
This initial movement from the same locality rule to the similar 
community rule, instead of a national rule,212 was reflective of the view 
“that a physician or surgeon who practices in a small or rural com-
munity does not have the same opportunities and resources for keep-
ing abreast of the advances in medical science as do the doctors prac-
ticing in the larger, more sophisticated cities.”213  However, there has 
been a marked trend by state courts to move to a national standard of 
care for both general practitioners and specialists.214  These courts 
have reevaluated the 
justification for a different and perhaps lower standard of care in 
a geographically defined area, namely, the lack of opportunity to 
 
doctors who provide patient care in a “non-negligent manner” are qualified for staff 
privileges; as such, targeted physician was denied staff privileges as he demonstrated 
a “lack of competence, skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by members of the 
medical profession in the locality.”); Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dir. of St. Mary’s Hosp. and 
Med. Ctr., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1985) (standard that excluded physicians 
from staff privileges who did not provide “high quality” care was based on the stan-
dard of medical care in the community and in the hospital). 
 208 See generally James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of “Locality Rule” in 
Malpractice Action Against Physician Who Is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R. 3d 1133 (2005). 
 209 See infra notes 228–33 and accompanying text. 
 210 See generally Pearson, supra note 208; see also Howard L. Nations & Jay Surgent, 
Medical Malpractice and the Locality Rule, 14 S. TEX. L. REV. 129 (1973); Jon R. Waltz, 
The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 408 (1969). 
 211 Pearson, supra note 208, § 2 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 212 Some courts focus on geographic proximity to determine similarity, and some 
look to general socioeconomic variables, while others consider “factors relating to 
the practice of medicine such as the equivalence of the medical facilities in the 
communities.”  Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical 
Specialist as Determined by Local, “Like Community,” State, National, or Other Standards, 18 
A.L.R. 4th 603, § 2 (2005). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id.; see also Pearson, supra note 208, § 6. 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
1224 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1179 
keep up with modern trends, is no longer valid in an age of ubiq-
uitous national communication networks, increasing standardiza-
tion of medical and specialist training and equipment, free flow 
of scientific information among medical institutions throughout 
the country, and professional journals and numerous other net-
works of continuing education which are national in scope . . . .215 
In spite of the choice in malpractice cases by state courts to 
move away from a narrow locality rule in favor of either a similar 
community rule or a national rule, the choice of a large number of 
hospitals216 has been to impose a standard in peer review that is even 
 
 215 Zitter, supra note 212, § 2. 
 216 In Laje v. R.E. Thomason General Hospital, 564 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1977), the 
plaintiff, Dr. Laje, was discharged as clinical director of psychiatry for the defendant 
hospital as a result of a personal conflict with another physician that was found to 
have had no relation to clinical care.  Id. at 1160–62.  After his discharge, Dr. Laje 
applied for staff privileges at the hospital.  Id. at 1160.  The application was denied 
based on the evidence of several of the department of psychiatry physicians that, in 
their opinion, Dr. Laje’s treatment of several patients was below a level of compe-
tence that they personally found acceptable.  Id. at 1161.  The trial court concluded 
that the finding of incompetency was not based on substantial evidence, as only 
.0082% of the files of patients treated by Dr. Laje were reviewed and the review was 
conducted in a hasty fashion.  Id.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that “[t]he 
hospital, and not the courts, must set the level of competence to be required of staff 
members.”  Id. at 1162.  The role of the court is to ensure that the “procedures em-
ployed by the hospital are fair, that the standards set by the hospital are reasonable, 
and that they have been applied without arbitrariness or capriciousness.”  Laje, 564 
F.2d at 1162. 
See also Tasher v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., No. 87-1139, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1018, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 8, 1988) (practice of targeted physician “deviated signifi-
cantly” from the practices of other members of the department); Nafrawi v. 
Hendrick Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp. 770, 776 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (targeted physician did 
not have the “requisite medical competence” in the opinions of other hospital staff 
members); Murdoch v. Knollwood Park Hosp., 585 So. 2d 873, 875 (Ala. 1991) (after 
a hearing in which members of the Executive Committee quizzed the targeted physi-
cian on the “appropriate” treatment for patients in several hypothetical situations, 
staff privileges were denied based on “standard of patient care practice being less 
than the aims of the medical staff . . . .”); Cipriotti v. Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. 
Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367, 370 (Ct. App. 1983) (corrective action taken 
when professional conduct falls below “standards or aims of the medical staff”); Ad-
kins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill. 1989) (physician’s 
treatment of patients failed to conform to the “Center’s standard of competence”); 
Pulido v. St. Joseph Mem’l Hosp., 547 N.E.2d 1383, 1386–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) 
(summary suspension of staff privileges when performance of doctor was “deficient” 
as it did not meet “the standards and aims of the medical staff”); Head v. Lutheran 
Med. Hosp., 516 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (measuring physician compe-
tence by application of “a standard of reasonableness as dictated by the quality of 
medical care expected from a member of the Medical Staff of Lutheran General 
Hospital”); Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. of Mary Francis Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W.2d 
284, 286 (Iowa 1966) (failure to provide “adequate” medical care as judged by an in-
house standard); Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 N.W. 2d 581, 588 (Minn. 1977) 
(corrective action appropriate when “professional conduct of any member of the 
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more limited in scope than the locality rule.  These hospitals have 
adopted what can be seen as a ‘super-locality rule’; in other words, 
the standard of care which is practiced within the hospital itself.  This 
standard is referred to in this Article as the ‘in-house’ measurement.  
This choice is especially problematic in its potential to unlink peer 
review decision-making from quality of care concerns and to nega-
tively impact quality of patient care. 
The lesson from tort jurisprudence that should be carried over 
to peer review is that incorporating the locality rule, much less a su-
per-locality rule, into hospital peer review could act to insulate a col-
lection of poor quality practitioners who treat patients in accordance 
with scientifically invalidated local customary care.  If this situation 
developed, the hospital could be barred from raising the quality of its 
patient care to national standards.  This situation could occur, for in-
stance, when an incompetent physician is identified and this physi-
cian is a member of a majority which is resistant to setting higher 
practice standards.  Under an in-house standard, the only available 
in-house testimony may support the same low standard of care as is 
being practiced by the targeted physician.  Thus, the quality of pa-
tient care could remain stalled at a very poor level. 
Or other problems could arise.  There are many different ac-
ceptable customs within the medical profession on how to handle a 
particular medical situation and there can be wide variations in the 
practices followed among physicians working in the same hospital.  
The majority of the medical staff may choose to follow one custom, 
while a minority may follow another.  While both are accepted meth-
ods of treatment, under the standards in this category, the minority 
group’s staff privileges could be at risk merely because they follow a 
different custom than the majority.  If the standard of care is estab-
lished by an in-house measurement and if, for example, the targeted 
physician is an ob/gyn, the very group of ob/gyns who have identi-
fied the allegedly incompetent physician in the first place are likely to 
be the ‘experts’ whose testimony will be used to establish the in-house 
standard of care.217  The targeted physician may have a difficult, if not 
 
staff shall be considered to be lower than the standard of the hospital or the medical 
staff . . . .”); Moss v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (1978) (failure to 
meet “hospital’s standards of surgical competence”). 
 217 For example, in Rhee v. El Camino Hospital District, 247 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Ct. App. 
1988), a newly minted surgeon who had excellent credentials and training evalua-
tions during his residency ran afoul of a group of surgeons in the hospital where he 
started his practice.  Id. at 483.  Members of this group of physicians both testified 
that Dr. Rhee “did not ‘meet the general standards of the surgical community at El 
Camino Hospital’” and served on the peer review panels charged with judging 
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impossible, task attempting to convince another physician from that 
ob/gyn practice group to testify on his or her behalf.  This is espe-
cially true if the adverse testimony is coming from either the head of 
the department, or another powerful member of the medical staff, or 
from multiple members of the staff.218 
The in-house standard may also have the negative impact of sti-
fling innovation.  It is possible that this minority may be comprised of 
those who have adopted cutting edge innovative practices which en-
hance medical outcomes and increase patient safety.  The staff privi-
leges of physicians who have adopted the innovative practices are at 
high risk as these physicians are practicing ahead of the curve.  The 
physicians who wish to adopt new innovative practices may be de-
terred from doing so out of a reluctance to place their staff privileges 
at risk. 
For example, take the hypothetical case of a brilliant, newly 
minted ob/gyn who has been trained in all the latest theories and 
techniques in a major metropolitan area.  She finishes her internship 
and residency in a major city at one of the best hospitals in the coun-
try.  She then moves into a small rural community to be near her ag-
ing parents who are farmers.  She is the first new ob/gyn to have staff 
privileges in the small local hospital in twenty years.  The ob/gyns 
and general surgeons resent the new physician as her new practice 
immediately carves into their patient base.  Her cutting edge training 
leads both the new physician and many patients of the incumbent 
physicians to question the use of dated, highly questionable methods 
of treatment by the incumbent physicians.  A high risk patient of the 
new physician dies in child birth through no misstep of the new phy-
sician.  Merely because other members of the medical staff would 
have handled the patient differently, with no evidence of a better 
outcome, the new physician’s staff privileges could be terminated as 
she did not comply with the customary care of the hospital.  It is 
 
whether Dr. Rhee met this in-house standard.  Id. at 249.  See also Lee v. Trinity Lu-
theran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2005) (physician lost staff privileges in 
peer review proceeding where her experts opined that a mixture of two drugs was 
within standard of care; hospital’s expert opined that it was not.  The mixture of two 
drugs later became a common treatment for AIDS.); Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 
822 F. Supp. 1361, 1364–68 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (whether a patient’s condition requires 
surgery is a matter of judgment; in a case where privileges were terminated, physi-
cian’s expert witnesses supported his judgment, but hospital’s expert witnesses dis-
agreed); Moss, 403 N.Y.S.2d, at 569–71 (pointing out that a case where privileges 
were denied based on a failure to meet a hospital’s standards of competence involved 
matters of judgment in procedure and technique; the physician’s witnesses sup-
ported his exercise of judgment but hospital’s chief of surgery disagreed). 
 218 See infra note 259. 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
2006] HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW 1227 
unlikely that the courts will reach the merits of her case as her appeal 
will be summarily denied as long as the process protections, such as a 
hearing, right to counsel, and cross-examination of witnesses, were 
provided. 
This in-house measurement could also create a very costly and 
protracted process.  It is possible that a physician appealing a rec-
ommended sanction will propound discovery requests that include 
disclosure of the patient records of other colleagues in the relevant 
department to demonstrate what the custom is in that department219 
and that he or she conforms to that custom.220  In addition, expert 
testimony is likely to be introduced to show that the targeted physi-
cian’s conduct was comparable or better than that of other physicians 
in the same department.221 
Finally, a physician may be deterred from identifying another 
member of the department who is not competent as the patient re-
 
 219 The standards of admissibility of evidence are much more liberal in peer re-
view proceedings than at trial.  Generally, medical staff by-laws will specify that admis-
sibility issues should be weighed against one commonly used standard: “whether or 
not a responsible person would normally rely on this evidence when conducting se-
rious business affairs.” AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, HEARING OFFICER GUIDEBOOK 33 
(1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3)(C)(iv) (2000) (stating that the physician has 
the right to present evidence determined to be relevant by the hearing officer, re-
gardless of its admissibility in a court of law). 
 220 For example, in Tasher v. St. Tammany Parish Hospital, No. 87-1139, 1988 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1018 (E.D. La. Feb. 8, 1988), the Executive Committee established that 
the targeted physician did not meet the standard of care of the hospital, as his prac-
tice “deviated significantly” from the practices of the other members of the depart-
ment.  Id. at *2.  The Executive Committee relied on a review it conducted that com-
pared the targeted physician’s complication rate and frequency of multiple surgical 
procedures with the complication rates and performance of multiple surgeries by 
other members of the department.  Id.  In addition, the review revealed that the tar-
geted physician routinely performed some surgeries that were rarely performed by 
other members of the department.  Id. 
Just as such a comparison is relevant to show nonconformity with an in-house 
standard, it is relevant to show conformity as well.  But see Richards v. Emanuel 
County Hosp. Auth., 603 F. Supp. 81, 86 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (finding no merit to a tar-
geted physician’s claim of a violation of equal protection of the law because he was 
the only one targeted even though “‘other members of the medical staff [we]re no 
better’”; when “‘a standard reasonable on its face is applied in good faith, the one 
who fails to meet the standard has not been denied constitutional equal protection 
just because others have not likewise been held accountable’” (quoting Woodbury v. 
McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 845–46 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 221 The broad scope of relevant discovery will expose private and sensitive patient 
information to an ever-expanding circle of individuals well beyond the expectations 
of the patient, with greater chances of inadvertent disclosure.  This is especially true 
if the case actually proceeds to court.  While the oft-touted solution is to redact iden-
tifying patient information, a crew of individuals is needed to complete this task.  
Plus, identifying information may be inadvertently missed. 
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cords of all the physicians in the department may become subject to 
scrutiny for comparative purposes.  Thus, applying the in-house stan-
dard of care could act to short circuit the goal of peer review to en-
hance the quality of patient care. 
Adding to the confusion, the language used by the standards 
which fall into this category allows for a situation where the decision-
makers could define the standard of care themselves ex ante, only af-
ter the targeted physician’s competency has been questioned.  As 
with the first category of standards, this allows the administrative de-
cision-makers the discretion to define incompetence without limita-
tion in a ‘we know it when we see it fashion.’  Further complicating 
matters is the same possibility that arose with the first category of 
standards; it is possible that the standard used by the hospital could 
be a moving target, varying depending on the make-up of the deci-
sional body. 
3. Customs of the Medical Community 
Another interpretation of these in-house standards is that they 
are referring to the fact that the medical staff or hospital can choose 
the standard it wants to govern.  This means that the medical staff or 
the hospital could choose either the customs followed in the hospital 
or those of the medical community generally.  In other words, when a 
by-law allows for corrective action when clinical care falls below the 
“standards or aims of the medical staff,”222 the medical staff is not lim-
ited to the application of the customs employed within the hospital, 
but is free to choose to follow the customs of the broader medical 
community. 
This interpretation creates even more challenges for a physician 
who is trying to conform to the standards for competency.  Are the 
“standards or aims of the medical staff” to impose a standard of care 
which applies in the locality,223 the same or similar community,224 or 
those which apply on a national level?225  Decades of tort jurispru-
dence in the area of medical malpractice and the series of studies re-
 
 222 Cipriotti v. Bd. of Dir. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 
367, 370 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 223 See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 224 See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 225 Kaplan v. Carney, 404 F. Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. Miss. 1975).  In Kaplan, the stan-
dards that were used to judge plaintiff’s performance included “that of acceptability 
in reference to the Hospital’s staff; the general standards of this country; the stan-
dards of the area; the standards of the hospital; or the standards of acceptability to 
the Executive Committee.”  Id. 
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ferred to earlier226 have established that the customs applied by each 
of these measurements can be strikingly different.227  Nothing in these 
types of standards give a physician any guidance with regard to which 
customs will apply.  In one case, this ambiguity meant that the physi-
cian was subjected to all four standards in the same proceeding.228 
Once again, the adoption of the standards in this category unjus-
tifiably skews the balance between competing interests in favor of 
hospital autonomy in staffing decisions, providing little to no protec-
tion to physicians’ interests in the practice of their profession and the 
patients’ right to choose their own physician.  The standards that fall 
into this category still unjustifiably allow a grave risk of the termina-
tion of staff privileges based on inappropriate considerations under 
the guise of enhancing the quality of patient care. 
C. Negligence Standards 
Finally, there are those standards that expressly incorporate tort 
law doctrine such as by-laws which state that clinical care will warrant 
corrective action when a physician fails to provide patient care in a 
‘non-negligent manner’229 or has committed ‘gross negligence.’230  
Also included in this category are those standards which impliedly in-
corporate tort doctrine by modeling themselves on the tort standard 
of care which is used to evaluate liability for harm.  Examples include 
language that allows for corrective action when a physician “failed to 
exercise the degree of care and skill that a reasonably careful and 
skilled surgeon would have exercised in the circumstances”231 or 
“failed to possess the degree of care and skill ordinarily possessed by 
reasonably skilled surgeons”232 or when there is a “failure to conform 
 
 226 See supra Part VI.B.1. 
 227 See infra notes 182–203 and accompanying text. 
 228 Kaplan, 404 F. Supp. at 164–65. 
 229 Branch v. Hempstead County Mem’l Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 908, 917 (W.D. Ark. 
1982) (“The governing body has a duty to establish procedures that will insure that 
only qualified doctors provide services to patients of the hospital in a non-negligent 
manner . . . .”). 
 230 Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc’y of Am., Inc., 609 P.2d 24, 30 (Alaska 
1980) (staff privileges only reduced or terminated upon finding of gross negligence). 
 231 Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass’n, 523 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1975) (hearing 
panel terminated staff privileges, finding that the surgeon “failed to exercise the de-
gree of care and skill that a reasonably careful and skilled surgeon would have exer-
cised in the circumstances,” and “failed to possess the degree of care and skill ordi-
narily possessed by reasonably skilled surgeons”). 
 232 Id. 
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to the standards of care and skill prevailing among reasonably com-
petent orthopedic surgeons . . . .”233 
Arguably, the standards in this category offer the greatest clarity 
because they can be interpreted to incorporate the standards that 
apply generally in a medical malpractice case.234  Thus, these stan-
dards rely on the large corpus of tort jurisprudence that has devel-
oped over the past decades which parallel rapid advances in medicine 
and technology.  However, as Professor Clark Havighurst points out, 
[a]s malpractice law is currently administered, its requirements 
are extraordinarily vague and unpredictable. . . . Given the con-
siderable vagueness of the standards it imposes so rigorously on 
physicians, the tort system would probably not survive scrutiny 
under constitutional norms of due process if it operated as a pub-
lic regulatory program de jure as well as de facto.235 
The due process concerns raised by vague standards are more 
serious in the context of peer review than in malpractice litigation or 
medical licensure proceedings.  The decision-makers in malpractice 
litigation or medical licensure proceedings are judges, juries and ad-
ministrative officials who are unlikely to have had prior dealings or 
involvement with the targeted physician.  With peer review, it is 
highly likely that the decision-makers have had both personal and 
economic dealings with the targeted physician.236  Peer review mem-
bers may feel pressure to bow to the wishes of the executive commit-
tee (or other powerful members of the hospital staff) to terminate 
the targeted physician.  While vagueness concerns are important in 
all of these proceedings, the risks to a fair process are greater in peer 
review, requiring much greater clarity in the standards used. 
As stated earlier, in order to meet the ‘standard of care’ under 
tort law, a physician must “possess and use the care, skill and knowl-
 
 233 Stiller v. La Porte Hosp., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (loss of 
staff privileges for “failure to conform to the standards of care and skill prevailing 
among reasonably competent orthopedic surgeons”); see also Head v. Lutheran Gen. 
Hosp., 516 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (measuring physician competence by 
application of “a standard of reasonableness as dictated by the quality of medical care 
expected from a member of the Medical Staff of Lutheran General Hospital”). 
 234 Another possible interpretation is that these standards are referring to the 
standards which apply in a general negligence action, not a medical malpractice ac-
tion.  Unlike general negligence cases that allow custom as some evidence of the 
standard of care, the general rule in most states is that custom is conclusive evidence 
of the standard of care in a malpractice action.  See infra note 258. 
 235 Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 96. 
 236 See generally Blum, supra note 24, at 470–74 (explaining how credentialing in-
cludes economic considerations blurring the line between business and quality 
judgments). 
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edge ordinarily possessed and used under like circumstances . . . .”237  
Evidence of this failure occurs when the physician does not take the 
same actions customarily taken by other physicians in similar circum-
stances.238  This customary practice standard is ordinarily established 
by the introduction of the testimony of medical experts.239 
Once again, the uncertainties and ambiguities associated with 
the customary care measure arise.  Even if knowable customs do exist, 
the standards in this category fail to provide notice of which custom-
ary rules should apply; those which would be found by applying the 
in-house rule, the same locality rule, the similar community rule, or 
the national rule.240  Depending on the rule followed, the customs 
used to measure physician competence could be markedly different.  
Thus, as discussed in much greater detail in the next sections, meas-
uring clinical competence by a negligence standard is also inherently 
vague. 
D. Extraordinary Vagueness of Standards Currently Used  
in Peer Review 
All three categories of the standards currently being utilized are 
extremely vague.  These standards do not provide notice to the physi-
cians, do not limit the discretion of the decision-makers in peer re-
view and do not provide the opportunity for any meaningful judicial 
review of peer review decisions.  As such, peer review hearings which 
employ these vague standards are not fundamentally fair.  An essen-
tial precondition for immunity from suit by an aggrieved physician 
under HCQIA is that the peer review process be fundamentally fair.  
The vagueness of all three categories of standards currently applied 
in peer review places all of the participants in the peer review process 
at risk of the loss of HCQIA immunity. 
In addition, this vagueness allows for peer review to be used both 
to hold physicians accountable for poor performance and to protect 
hospital autonomy in staffing decisions based on reasons unrelated to 
quality of care concerns.  Whether these standards are narrowly tai-
lored enough to justify the limits HCQIA and state statutes place on 
aggrieved physicians’ access to the judicial system is questionable. 
 
 237 Burns v. Metz, 513 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Neb. 1994); Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 
185 (Ind. 1992).  For an excellent overview of medical malpractice law, see DOBBS, 
supra note 177, § 243, at 634–35. 
 238 See DOBBS, supra note 177, § 243, at 634. 
 239 Id. 
 240 For a description of these rules, see infra notes 241–56 and accompanying text. 
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As they are currently drafted, even the third category of stan-
dards, which incorporate tort doctrine, still appear to be too vague to 
protect physicians’ interests and too overbroad to justify the immu-
nity granted by federal and state legislation.  But what if these stan-
dards were redrafted both to provide expressly the locality from 
which customary care evidence was to be drawn and that customary 
care should only be some evidence, instead of conclusive evidence, of 
the standard of care?  Would physicians’ interests be better pro-
tected?  And what impact would importing tort doctrine into the peer 
review process have on the quality of patient care?  Finally, is a better 
solution to replace vague standard of care language entirely with con-
tract principles based on clinical practice guidelines? 
VII.    A VIABLE SOLUTION TO VAGUENESS CONCERNS: TORT  
DOCTRINE OR CONTRACT PRINCIPLES? 
There are three possible routes to implementing a more bal-
anced approach to measuring clinical competence.  One path is to 
amend a hospital’s medical staff by-laws to reflect a whole-sale adop-
tion of malpractice doctrine to evaluate physician competence, being 
sure to specify the locality from which any evidence of customary care 
will be taken.  Another path is to rewrite the medical staff by-laws to 
use express contractual terminology such as ‘expectations of per-
formance’ as evidenced by clinical practice guidelines (“CPGs”).  
There are problems with both of these options.  While the whole-sale 
adoption of tort doctrine will provide enhanced protection to physi-
cians’ interests, it may negatively impact the quality of patient care.  
The alternative, the application of contract principles incorporating 
CPGs, is a viable solution which will take time (perhaps measured in 
decades rather than years) to fully implement.  For an immediate so-
lution, a marriage between contract principles using CPGs and a 
carefully carved out portion of tort doctrine dealing with the stan-
dard of care can act as a stop-gap measure.  Over time, as evidence-
based medicine continues to develop, contract principles using CPGs 
can increasingly be used to supplant this stop-gap measure of clinical 
competence. 
A. Applying Malpractice Doctrine in Peer Review 
Amending a hospital’s by-laws to both adopt malpractice doc-
trine and expressly designate the locality from which the customary 
practice will be drawn may greatly increase protection for physicians’ 
interests.  However, the price to be paid in patient safety by going this 
route may be too great.  The questionable merit of the main precept 
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upon which the malpractice system is based and the different goals of 
each process should be carefully considered when contemplating 
whether this is the right solution.  Malpractice doctrine was devel-
oped to evaluate liability based on the concept of fault for harm to a 
single patient through litigation.  In contrast, the peer review process 
is designed to measure the competence of a physician’s care of mul-
tiple patients241 over a long period of time.242  Fault is not a factor in 
 
 241 Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ill. 1989) (staff 
privileges terminated based upon peer review evaluation of thirteen areas of defi-
cient performance based on thirty patient charts); Knapp v. Palos Cmty. Hosp., 531 
N.E.2d 989, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (peer review considered six general charges 
based on thirty-eight patient charts); Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581, 
584 (Minn. 1977) (peer review hearing considered 231 separate deficiencies which 
occurred in the treatment of eighty-six different patients).  A one-time incident of 
poor judgment is insufficient evidence of overall incompetence.  However, in Mai-
mon v. The Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 458 N.E.2d 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), 
the targeted physician had a history of conflict with hospital administration.  Id. at 
1319.  A complaint for corrective action alleged that the targeted physician had at-
tempted to induce a woman’s labor solely for the physician’s convenience.  Id.  The 
targeted physician’s admitting privileges were restricted while the peer review proc-
ess was pending.  Id.  The additional allegations of non-compliance with hospital 
rules dealt with a failure to comply with the terms of this suspension.  Id.  In spite of 
the fact that this was a one-time judgment call and there were no complaints regard-
ing the quality of care of hundreds of other patients, the executive committee termi-
nated the physician’s staff privileges.  Id. at 1319–20.  A similar situation occurred in 
Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hospital, 495 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1972), where a 
physician’s privileges were terminated based on only two incidents, neither of which 
caused any harm to a patient.  Id. at 606–09.  The first involved a failure to use sterile 
gloves when performing a spinal tap.  Id. at 610.  The second involved arriving to 
perform surgery when in no condition physically or mentally to do so.  Id.  The phy-
sician readily acquiesced to a request to reschedule the surgery and successfully per-
formed the operation at a later time.  Id.  As the dissent pointed out, “[s]uch an iso-
lated act without injury cannot be a reasonable basis for revocation of staff privileges, 
for if it is, and if enforced equally and without discrimination, medical staffs will dis-
appear entirely.  Every professional man errs from time to time.”  Id. at 610 (Thomp-
son, J., dissenting). 
 242 If there is an isolated incident, the head of the department should counsel the 
physician.  Only if there are repeated incidents should peer review be triggered.  
Normally, peer review focuses on the treatment of a large number of patients over a 
period of time.  This is because the focus of peer review is to determine the overall 
competence of a physician.  As a physician commonly treats hundreds of patients a 
year, this means the review of a large number of patient charts to determine if there 
is a pattern or practice of low quality care.  However, there are occasions when the 
treatment of a single patient can trigger peer review that ends in the termination of 
staff privileges.  Logically, as the goal of peer review is not for the purposes of pun-
ishment but to enhance the quality of care, termination of staff privileges should 
only be warranted if the injury to this single patient was both severe (or potentially 
so) and the incident indicates some greater problem with the physician’s overall 
competency which raises the possibility of harm to other patients.  It is fair to assume 
that, as physicians are human and are not perfect, mistakes will be made.  It is only 
when those mistakes create a pattern that demonstrates incompetence that termina-
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this calculus.  Attention should be paid to the fact that tort doctrine 
carries with it a whole series of qualifiers which are aimed at limiting 
liability to ‘faulty’ conduct.  When used in the context of peer review, 
these qualifiers may tip the balance between the stakeholders in the 
peer review process toward protecting the interests of the physician, 
but only at an unacceptable cost to patient safety. 
1. Customary Care as a Measure of Physician Competence 
Both malpractice theory and the current use of customary care 
measurements in hospitals are based on the premise that there are 
identifiable customs or norms against which to measure a physician’s 
conduct.  In peer review, this measure is being used to determine 
competence.  In tort, this measure is being used to determine fault 
and, therefore, culpability.  However, research has raised serious 
questions about both the existence of knowable and agreed upon 
medical customs and the medical benefits of some customary care.243  
Moreover, many customs that do exist are suspect having evolved dur-
ing the fee-for-service system of health care reimbursement that en-
couraged the over-utilization of medical services by both physicians 
and patients through economic incentives.244  Therefore, framing a 
solution that continues to rely on custom may be ill-advised as it is 
fraught with uncertainties with regard to the scientific bases upon 
which many customs or practice norms are grounded, may be based 
on a fiction that medical custom standards or norms actually exist, 
and, to the extent that they do exist, such medical custom standards 
or norms may be tainted by insurance induced ‘moral hazard.’245 
2. Choosing Customs 
The medical malpractice common law of the different states var-
ies with regard to the locality from which they draw their customary 
practices.  States have chosen to apply the customs followed by the 
practitioners in the local community under the “same locality rule”246 
or another community under the “similar community rule,”247 or cus-
 
tion is appropriate.  Otherwise, as the dissent in Moore points out, all physicians will 
ultimately lose staff privileges.  495 P.2d at 610 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 243 See supra notes 177–201 and accompanying text. 
 244 See supra notes 177–201 and accompanying text. 
 245 Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 98 n.33.  
“Moral hazard arises whenever one person (for example, a doctor or patient) is in a 
position to spend or risk resources belonging to another (for example, a health in-
surer).”  Id. 
 246 See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 247 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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tomary care on a national level under the “national rule.”248  If a hos-
pital chooses to adopt a malpractice standard, it will also have to 
make this choice.  Regardless of whether one accepts that customs or 
norms do exist, the impact on quality of patient care by adopting tort 
doctrine still may depend on this choice.249  The problems associated 
with the choice of an in-house standard or a local standard have al-
ready been discussed in prior sections.250  Adopting tort doctrine 
which incorporates these choices into peer review would merely be 
perpetuating these same problems.  But what if the by-laws expressly 
state that the national standard of care will be used as the measure of 
competency? 
3. The National Standard of Care 
Arguably, adopting the national standard of care is the choice of 
measures of clinical competence that will both protect the interests of 
physicians and enhance the quality of patient care.  Any expert testi-
mony must establish the basis for asserting that the target physician’s 
conduct falls below the national standard.  On the surface at least, 
adopting the national standard limits the discretion of the peer re-
view panel by linking their ability to act to quality of patient care con-
cerns.  However, as explained above, the idea that there is such a na-
tional standard of care is suspect in the first instance.  Compounding 
this concern, the representative of the hospital who is prosecuting the 
case is likely to choose experts based on the positions that the experts 
will take.251  As such, the experts are likely to become mere proxies for 
 
 248 See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 249 See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra Part VI.B. 
 251 Experts are chosen on the basis of the positions they will take and their per-
ceived ability to persuade a jury, or a peer review panel, to accept their view of the 
targeted physician’s conduct.  Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra 
note 182, at 98.  For example, in Islami v. Covenant Medical Center, 822 F. Supp. 1361 
(N.D. Iowa 1992), the peer review matter came down to a battle of the experts.  Id. at 
1364–68.  Based on a charge that a physician was performing surgeries unnecessarily, 
the highly-qualified expert hired by the executive committee to provide an outside 
review recommended the corrective action of requiring that the targeted physician 
obtain a second opinion prior to performing all major surgeries.  Id. at 1366.  The 
three highly-qualified experts hired by the targeted physician disagreed that the sur-
geries were unwarranted.  Id. at 1367.  The case came down to a battle of the experts, 
with the executive committee ultimately giving more credibility to their own expert 
in setting especially harsh corrective measures that effectively terminated the tar-
geted physician’s staff privileges.  Id. at 1368. 
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the standard of care judgments of the complaining members of the 
medical staff as given voice by the executive committee.252 
Moreover, overall clinical competence is an assessment that 
should be made over a period of time which involves the care of mul-
tiple patients.253  This means that a series of incidents, each standing 
alone, may not be sufficient for corrective action.  But viewed in toto, 
these incidents could add up to a pattern of overall poor quality of 
care.  As such, the physician is likely to challenge the assessment of 
each incident on the proper practice custom and whether that stan-
dard was violated.  This boils down to a battle of the experts on what 
the standard of care is for each event and whether the physician has 
violated that standard.  This, in all likelihood, involves multiple ‘trials 
within a trial.’  Such a proceeding, extraordinarily expensive and 
time consuming enough when dealing with the care of just one pa-
tient, would involve an enormous amount of time and expense.254  
 
 252 While it does not erase the issue of whether a national standard of care actually 
exists, those hospitals which send patient files to outside organizations which provide 
an independent review by physician specialists appear to provide the most objectively 
fair evaluation of physician competence under this current system of evaluation.  For 
example, the hospital in Harris v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 13 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 
1994), requested that Confidential Peer Review, Ltd. (“CPR”) provide an independ-
ent review.  CPR is an organization comprised of physicians with both academic and 
medical credentials which reviews the performance of health care providers 
throughout the United States.  Id. at 1084.  “A CPR review consists of four phases: 
determining the case mix and time frame to be reviewed; reviewing administrative 
records; on-site inspection of medical records selected by the team; and preparing a 
final report that includes findings, conclusions, and recommendations.”  Id.; see also 
Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 2005) (five charts sent 
for external review by expert who opined that physician did “not [meet] the standard 
of care.”); Islami, 822 F. Supp. at 1364–68 (patient charts sent to outside expert); 
Branch v. Hempstead County Mem’l Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 908, 912–13 (W.D. Ark. 
1982) (noting that the hospital sent charts of operations performed by the targeted 
physician to the Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, which is the “Professional 
Standards Review Organization (PSRO) for the State of Arkansas with the responsi-
bility to review all federally funded patients, to assure that the care that they receive 
meets professionally recognized standards”). 
 253 One example of an objective national standard is the comparison of a physi-
cian’s mortality and morbidity rates with the national standards for the type and na-
ture of the physician’s practice.  See, e.g., Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
808 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1991) (loss of staff privileges for elective cardiac surgery 
for excessive complication and mortality rates compared with national standards).  It 
is important to note that evaluation of competence should not be limited to this type 
of measure, which is reflective of low quality care that has, in fact, caused harm.  A 
hospital should not be limited to merely a reactive role by being barred from acting 
until incompetence actually causes harm.  A hospital must be able to proactively pre-
vent harm. 
 254 For example, in Spencer v. Community Hospital of Evanston (Spencer II), 408 
N.E.2d 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), the hearing on the evaluation of the charges against 
the target physician as part of the formal peer review took a total of twenty-five ses-
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These transaction costs may deter the hospital from proceeding 
unless absolutely necessary and under circumstances where the like-
lihood of success is high.  Such an event would also unduly burden 
both the physicians who sit on the appeals panel and their patients by 
keeping the reviewing physicians from attending to their practices for 
a protracted period of time. 
Hospitals engaging in a risk/benefit analysis to determine 
whether to initiate an investigation and pursue corrective action 
against an incompetent physician are likely to balance the expendi-
ture of resources in time and money against the chances of success 
and the potential for suit by an injured patient255 if the physician pro-
ceeds to provide poor care without intervention.  The overwhelming 
burdens of the current formal peer review process may discourage 
hospitals from engaging in peer review256 until a sufficient number of 
adverse events has occurred so that the incompetence of the physi-
cian is irrefutable.  Playing such a waiting game could place all of the 
hospital’s patients at risk until there was an acceptable level of cer-
tainty of a positive outcome. 
Thus, adopting the national standard of care into the peer re-
view process would only perpetuate the current system which relies 
on customs and norms.  Over and above this concern, adopting a 
negligence standard could add new problems to the mix. 
4. Tort Concepts Designed to Assign Liability on the  
Basis of Fault 
There are many doctrines that are part and parcel of malprac-
tice law that are not relevant to peer review and should not be con-
 
sions over a period of three months.  Id. at 984.  When considering the number of 
hours this entailed for the physician-members of the ad hoc hearing committee, the 
witnesses (all of whom were medical personnel taking time from patient care), the 
attorneys, the court reporter, and the hearing officer, the expenses, both in terms of 
dollars and time away from patient care, were tremendous.  Then add in the time 
spent by the various medical committees to investigate the matter initially and then 
to hear the appeals.  See also Spencer v. Cmty. Hosp. of Evanston (Spencer I), 332 
N.E.2d 525 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).  Finally, consider the extraordinary amount of time 
(from 1974, when the conflict began, until the final court verdict in 1980) and ex-
pense it took to go through the court proceedings in both Spencer I and Spencer II. 
 255 “An analogy between a surgeon and an airline pilot is not inapt: a hospital 
which closes its eyes to questionable competence and resolves all doubts in favor of 
the doctor does so at the peril of the public.”  Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 
Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 256 This may be one of the reasons that hospitals are not engaging in peer review 
in spite of the added encouragement of immunity created by state statutes and 
HCQIA.  See generally Scheutzow, supra note 96 (study that suggests that providing 
immunity does not encourage peer review). 
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sidered as part of the peer review process.  For example, the causa-
tion and damages elements of a negligence action are not relevant as 
the issue in peer review is not whether the physician has actually 
caused harm, but whether the physician is providing poor quality 
care that might lead to patient harm.257  Other examples include the 
defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.  As 
the focus of peer review is solely on the conduct of the physician, not 
the patient, these defenses are not relevant. 
While greatly enhancing the protection of physicians’ interests, 
the addition of these doctrines could actually be destructive to the 
goals of peer review.  Because the tort system is designed to evaluate 
liability for harm based on fault, malpractice jurisprudence revolving 
around standard of care measurements is packed with doctrines 
aimed at limiting liability to faulty conduct.258  Examples include the 
 
 257 There are five main elements of a cause of action for negligence: duty, breach, 
legally recognized harm, cause in fact and proximate cause.  See generally W. PAGE 
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, 164–68 (5th ed. 1984).  The only elements relevant to 
peer review are duty and breach.  Duty being defined as the responsibility of a physi-
cian to “‘possess and use the care, skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed and used 
under like circumstances.’”  DOBBS, supra note 177, § 243, at 634.  Breach is defined 
as a failure to provide that level of care.  Id.  Whether a physician has actually caused 
harm is not relevant.  Corrective action is necessary for the physician who is provid-
ing poor quality care that might cause harm.  The physician who has repeated ‘near 
misses’ comes to mind, where only the diligence of others or just plain luck has 
averted patient injury. 
 258 For example, under the tort law of the majority of states, if a physician follows 
the medical custom of the relevant community, he has not fallen below the standard 
of care “regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary.”  DOBBS, supra note 
177, § 242, at 633.  But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983–84 (Wash. 1974) (hold-
ing that the physician’s adherence to customary care did not insulate him from liabil-
ity).  In other words, the malpractice jurisprudence of the majority of states dictates 
that custom is the conclusive evidence of the standard of care.  Peters, supra note 
205, at 911–21.  Unlike a regular negligence case, the jury in a malpractice case is 
evaluating whether the physician has conformed to the applicable custom.  Id. at 
919–20.  If so, the physician is not liable.  The issue for the jury is not what the physi-
cian should have done under the circumstances, but what he actually did.  Id.  Thus, 
if the physician has conformed to acceptable social norms (customs) as defined by 
tort law, the physician is not at fault and would not be liable for any patient injury in 
a malpractice suit.  Id.  But, this physician may still be causing unnecessary and easily 
avoidable injuries to patients.  By incorporating tort theory into the peer review 
process, the physician may be insulated from any corrective measures and can pro-
ceed to subject patients to an unnecessary risk of harm.  Many new safety practices 
have recently been introduced since the To Err Is Human report, see supra note 1, ap-
proximately seven years ago.  Wachter, supra note 3, at 540.  However, the newer the 
safety precautions are, the less likely that they will be seen to be part of customary 
practice under tort law.  In fact, the safety precaution may be so new that basically no 
one in the relevant community has yet to follow it.  An even more problematic situa-
tion is created when a new safety practice reflects the exact opposite of a practice 
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‘two schools of thought’ doctrine or the ‘respectable minority rule,’259 
the ‘honest error rule,’260 and the ‘minimum competence’ doctrine.261  
 
that the profession at large customarily follows, but that scientific evidence reveals to 
unduly risk patient safety.  In all of these scenarios, adopting the standard of care 
used in malpractice litigation may insulate from corrective action a physician who 
willfully ignores new treatments, practices or procedures that are safer and/or more 
effective. 
 259 A similar result will be achieved in those jurisdictions that accept the ‘respect-
able minority’ or ‘differing school of thought’ doctrines.  DOBBS, supra note 177,  
§ 245, at 637.  “The two schools of thought doctrine provides an absolute defense to 
medical malpractice liability when a physician has chosen one medically acceptable 
course of action over alternative treatments that enjoy the support of other medical 
experts.”  Joan P. Dailey, Comment, The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent 
Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A Model for Integration, 98 DICK. L. REV. 713, 713 (1994).  
Generally, a second school of thought “exists when ‘reputable and respected’ medi-
cal authorities support a particular mode of treatment.”  Id.  However, some courts 
have attempted to limit this definition by holding that a second school of thought 
only will be legally recognized when it is supported by a “considerable number of 
recognized and respected professionals . . . .”  Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 
(Pa. 1992). 
In the context of peer review, as long as one group of physicians, or a respect-
able minority of physicians, refuses to adopt the new treatments or procedures, the 
recalcitrant physician can avoid corrective action.  On the other hand, a physician 
who is on the cutting edge of health care and adopts a new highly effective treatment 
risks sanction, as she is ahead of her colleagues and is not a part of a respectable mi-
nority or school of thought.  An example that arose in the context of a peer review 
case is Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hospital, 408 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2005).  In Lee, one of 
the reasons the physician’s privileges were terminated was that she was using a com-
bination of drugs to treat AIDS that only later became the standard of care.  Id. at 
1067.  Thus, this rule has a chilling effect on those physicians who may wish to em-
ploy a new treatment that is no longer experimental but has not yet been adopted by 
a considerable number of physicians.  As the court pointed out in Hubbard v. Calvin, 
147 Cal Rptr. 905 (Ct. App. 1978), a physician should be liable only if he or she 
failed to provide reasonable care under the circumstances, not because the physician 
does not follow his or her colleagues.  Id. at 907. 
 260 Another example of tort doctrine focusing on finding liability for fault that 
could place patient safety at risk is the very dated rule that a physician is “not liable 
for a bad result, nor for a mistake or error in judgment where he acted in good 
faith.”  DOBBS, supra, note 177, § 243, at 634 (citing Dotson v. Hammerman, 932 
S.W.2d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Donaldson v. Maffucci, 156 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1959); 
Gerald v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 937 P.2d 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)).  If adopted 
into peer review, the honest error, or the good faith mistake, rule may allow the phy-
sician who continuously makes mistakes and errors over a period of years to avoid 
corrective action.  If the physician is continually injuring patients, his subjective good 
faith is not relevant to peer review.  The vast majority of states have rejected this rule, 
with many replacing it with a new rule that states that a physician is not liable if he or 
she makes a good faith or honest error in judgment between two alternative courses 
of treatment, if both alternatives are reasonable under the circumstances.  DOBBS, 
supra note 177, § 243, at 635.  See also Perkins v. Walker, 406 N.W.2d 189, 190 (Iowa 
1987) (jury instruction that “a doctor cannot be found negligent merely because he 
makes a mistake in the diagnosis and treatment of a patient”); Hunsaker v. Bozeman 
Deaconess Found., 588 P.2d 493, 506–07 (Mont. 1978) (approved instruction “that 
an unsuccessful effort, a mistake, or an error in judgment is not necessarily negli-
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However, fault is not relevant in the context of peer review.  The fo-
cus of peer review is to identify and deal with those physicians who 
provide poor quality care.262 
 
gent”); Roach v. Hockey, 634 P.2d 249, 252 (Or. 1981) (After defining reasonable 
care by a physician, the court properly instructed “‘if the defendant in good faith and 
in the exercise of reasonable care erred in such judgment, then he would not be neg-
ligent’”); Miller v. Kennedy, 588 P.2d 734, 738 (Wash. 1978) (approving instruction 
“that a physician is not liable for an honest error of judgment where he or she has 
exercised the requisite degree of care and skill in arriving at the judgment”).  The 
problem, once again, is with the physician who repeatedly makes the wrong choice 
with multiple patients.  If the physician is continually injuring patients, his lack of 
fault as defined by tort doctrine is not relevant to peer review. 
 261 Should the physician be held to ordinary customary care, minimal customary 
care or reasonable care, or the best possible care?  Any one of these standards could 
apply.  In some jurisdictions, only minimal competence is required.  For example, in 
the medical malpractice case of Hall v. Hilbun, the standard of care expectation was 
set at a very low level: 
Each physician may with reason and fairness be expected to possess or 
have reasonable access to such medical knowledge as is commonly pos-
sessed or reasonably available to minimally competent physicians in the 
same specialty or general field of practice throughout the United 
States, to have a realistic understanding of the limitations on his or her 
knowledge or competence, and, in general, to exercise minimally ade-
quate medical judgment. 
Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985) (emphases added).  In spite of the 
fact that other states have not opted to adopt this measure into their medical mal-
practice law, hospitals in several states appear to have embraced the minimum com-
petence rule as the standard of care that applies in peer review proceedings.  See, e.g., 
Poe v. Charlotte Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (peer 
review showed a failure on the part of the physician “to meet the minimum standards 
of care for patients”); Balkissoon v. Capitol Hill Hosp., 558 A.2d 304, 305 (D.C. 1989) 
(physician hospital privileges terminated based on “failure to satisfy minimal stan-
dards”).  Adopting the Hall v. Hilbun version of the standard of care places a ceiling 
on quality aspirations and ties the hands of medical staffs which either seek to fur-
nish clinical privileges solely to physicians who provide the highest quality of care, or 
a quality of care that is above ordinary care.  Or, in states which adopt the minimal 
competence rule, impede hospitals which desire to grant clinical privileges to physi-
cians who are at least more than minimally competent.  Finally, there is one case 
where the hospital had at one time adopted a gross negligence rule into its peer re-
view process.  In Storrs v. Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of America, Inc., 661 P.2d 
632 (Alaska 1983), staff privileges were only reduced or terminated upon a finding of 
gross negligence.  Id. at 633–34.  This standard is so weighted in the favor of the in-
terests of the physician that it discounts the interests in patient safety entirely.  Under 
this standard, a physician who was repeatedly negligent, but was not grossly negli-
gent, in the care of his or her patients could maintain his or her hospital staff privi-
leges. 
 262 The End of the Beginning documents this very phenomenon: 
[W]ith the implementation of new safety systems (such as “sign your 
site” or read-backs of oral orders), a new problem has emerged: what to 
do with providers who willfully violate reasonable safety rules.  Nothing 
undercuts an institution’s effort to fully comply with safety regulations 
more than having an individual provider (particularly a prominent 
physician) regularly ignore the regulations.  As James Reason, one of 
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Wading through the morass of malpractice doctrines to decide 
which should or should not apply and the resultant impact the deci-
sions will have on the scope of discovery and other evidentiary issues 
could well bog down the peer review hearing process with endless 
motions and arguments.  As these cases are unlikely to reach the 
courts based on the limited scope of judicial review currently being 
applied, much of the decision-making in the context of formal peer 
review will go unreported and unreviewed.  This results in each hos-
pital across the country reinventing the wheel at each separate peer 
review hearing, examining the competency of physicians on an ad 
hoc case-by-case basis.  This piecemeal system can only culminate in a 
lack of uniformity in the treatment of physicians from hospital to 
hospital, and even from physician to physician within the same hospi-
tal. 
Overall, adopting malpractice doctrine to provide greater clarity 
to the measures of competence currently being applied in peer re-
view would be inadvisable.  While affording physicians’ interests 
greater protection by limiting the loss of staff privileges to situations 
where there has been a finding of fault, this limitation comes at too 
great a cost to the public’s interests in patient safety. 
B. Clinical Practice Guidelines in Peer Review 
Describing the expectations of physician performance in con-
tractual terms using clinical practice guidelines may avoid many of 
the pitfalls that are attendant to the current categories of standard of 
care measurements and could deflect the temptation to import inap-
propriate and destructive legal and evidentiary principles into the 
peer review process.  At least in theory, this approach will foster a 
more equitable balancing of the hospital’s quality of care concerns 
with the interests of the physician in a fair process of review for staff 
privileges.  This alternative arguably does more to ensure HCQIA 
protections for all involved in the process. 
 
the giants of systems theory, notes, “Seeing them get away with it on a 
daily basis does little for morale or for the credibility of the disciplinary 
system.” 
Wachter, supra note 3, at 540 (quoting JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 212 (1997)). 
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1. What are Clinical Practice Guidelines? 
The Institute of Medicine describes clinical practice guidelines 
(“CPGs”)263 as “systematically developed statements to assist practitio-
ner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific 
clinical circumstances.”264  Modern medical science, based on clinical 
outcomes and effectiveness research that integrates powerful com-
puter technologies with an ever-growing body of treatment data, can 
evaluate the optimum treatment approach for many types of clinical 
conditions.  CPGs are based on this modern medical science and rep-
resent “well-considered opinions of expert panels, based upon re-
views of the best available data, as to how physicians should approach 
certain clinical problems.”265  It is widely believed that CPGs will en-
hance the quality of care by reducing variation in practice and will 
move physicians more quickly toward current understandings of best 
medical practice derived from outcomes research.266  At the same 
time, CPGs can reduce the cost of care by promoting lower cost 
choices that produce the same outcomes as higher cost alternatives.267 
CPGs can generally be placed in three different categories, de-
pending upon their auspice and purpose.268  First, there are those 
which were created to improve clinical outcomes, called ‘standard of 
 
 263 CPGs are also referred to as ‘practice parameters,’ ‘clinical pathways,’ or ‘clini-
cal algorithms.’ 
 264 INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 
(Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990). 
 265 Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of 
Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483, 
1506 (1989). 
 266 Rosoff, supra note 185, at 369; AM. MED. ASS’N, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE 
PARAMETERS (1990); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM’N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 219–36 (recommending federal support for outcome research and crea-
tion of practice guidelines based thereon); see generally Brook et al., supra note 198; 
David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From Theory to Practice, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
287 (1990); Clark Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 
34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777 (1990) [hereinafter Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical 
Care]; Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn D. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current 
Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1989); 
Leahy, supra note 265; William Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to 
Evaluate and Improve Health Care, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197 (1988) (officials of the 
Health Care Financing Administration proposal); Symposium, Getting It Right: The 
Makings of Practice Guidelines, QUALITY REV. BULL., Feb. 1990, at 40. 
 267 Rosoff, supra note 185, at 370. 
 268 Id. at 370 (citing John Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 15 
J. LEGAL MED. 421, 436–38 (1994) (CPGs are created to assure quality of care, maxi-
mize efficient utilization or maximize profits for third party payers)); see also Maxwell 
J. Mehlman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome Measurement and 
Practice Standards, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 368, 375 (1990) (surveying the vari-
ous forms CPGs can take). 
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care’ guidelines.269  Second, there are those which were created to 
improve cost effectiveness, referred to as ‘appropriateness guide-
lines.’270  Many of the CPGs in this category only consider quality con-
cerns to the extent that quality is not unduly negatively impacted by 
cost reduction.271  In the third category, there are CPGs that couple 
the best of both worlds as they are both quality-enhancing and cost-
reducing.272 
While CPGs have played a role in the practice of medicine for a 
considerable period of time, there has been a relatively recent 
marked increase in the notice paid to the possible advantages of a 
greatly expanded role for CPGs in the delivery of patient care.  This 
increase in attention was triggered by the health systems research that 
revealed striking and unjustifiable variations in the choices that phy-
sicians made in the diagnosis and treatment of the same clinical con-
dition.273 
In response to the concerns these studies engendered in the 
general public and among insurers, managed care organizations, and 
the government, the American Medical Association strongly advo-
cated that private professional physician groups establish ‘practice 
parameters’ and instituted criteria and procedures for their devel-
opment.274  Private physician organizations representing physicians in 
specific practice areas responded by expending considerable efforts 
toward standardizing specifications for both the procedures for and 
the management of medical conditions.275  For example, very detailed 
and well-defined CPGs were developed by the American College of 
Physicians by virtue of the Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project.276  
Other examples include those enacted by the American College of 
Obstetrics and Gynecologists, the American Academy of Pediatrics,277 
 
 269 Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Co-
hesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 67, 67 (1991) [hereinafter Brennan, Practice 
Guidelines]. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Rosoff, supra note 185, at 371. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See supra notes 182–98 and accompanying text. 
 274 AM. MED. ASS’N, ATTRIBUTES TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE 
PARAMETERS (1990). 
 275 Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 89. 
 276 See INST. OF MED., ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 275–85 (1985). 
 277 See generally OFFICE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, AM. MED. ASS’N., LISTING OF PRACTICE 
PARAMETERS, GUIDELINES, AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS (1989); INST. OF MED., 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DIRECTORY: A PILOT REFERENCE TO ORGANIZATIONS, 
ASSESSMENTS AND INFORMATION RESOURCES (1988). 
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and those originally developed at Harvard to govern the delivery of 
anesthesia.278 
Government agencies also joined the CPG movement.  The 
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research runs the Medical Treat-
ment Effectiveness Program279 which “supports research, data devel-
opment, and other activities to develop and review clinically relevant 
guidelines, standards of quality, performance measures, and medical 
review criteria, in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of 
health care services.”280 
2. Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Peer Review 
This proposal envisions physicians, who make up a specific prac-
tice group within a hospital, setting up a working committee.  The 
task of this working committee is to propose to the entire practice 
 
 278 John Eichorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring During Anesthesia at Harvard 
Medical School, 256 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1017 (1986) (reductions of anesthesia-related 
injuries directly attributed to implementation of practice guidelines originally devel-
oped at Harvard); Paul R. McGinn, Practice Standards Leading to Premium Reductions, 
AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 2, 1988, at 1.  In addition, private hospitals are engaged in the 
ongoing process of developing clinical pathways.  Clinical pathways are similar to 
CPGs.  See generally DONNA D. IGNATAVICIUS & KATHY A. HAUSMAN, CLINICAL PATHWAYS 
FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE 10 (1995); Karen A. Butler, Comment, Health Care 
Quality Revolution: Legal Landmines for Hospitals and the Rise of the Critical Pathway, 58 
ALB. L. REV. 843 (1995).  Clinical pathways are interdisciplinary plans of care for 
more long-term conditions that detail the optimal sequence and timing of treat-
ments for patients with particular medical conditions as they progress through dif-
ferent stages of their disease process.  The team of practitioners, including the physi-
cians and support staff, meet to tailor the decision pathways to the needs of the 
particular patient.  The goal is to optimize the quality of the patient’s care by plan-
ning ahead for events that are likely to occur.  This planning can reduce delays, de-
crease the use of resources and provide a degree of certainty for both patients with 
long-term illnesses and those who care for them.  For example, University Hospitals 
of Cleveland generated a critical pathway for individuals who are ventilator depend-
ant.  By performing a retrospective chart review and projected reimbursement by 
third party payers, the Hospital was able to reduce the cost of caring for this popula-
tion.  Another example is a critical pathway that was created by Johns Hopkins Hos-
pital for individuals requiring the removal of their prostate gland. 
 279 The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (“AHCPR”) was created by 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, 42 U.S.C. § 299 (2000).  The 
AHCPR was created within the Public Health Service, a subdivision of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.  Id.  A separate office was created within the 
AHCPR called the Forum for Quality and Effectiveness in Health Care.  Havighurst, 
Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 90.  This Forum appoints pan-
els of physician experts and consumer representatives to oversee development of 
CPGs either by the panels themselves, by private organizations or by independent 
contractors.  See id. 
 280 FURROW ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 199, at 204.  The Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research is a part of the Public Health Service, which is a division of the 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
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group a set of CPGs that have been modified to fit the clinical care 
expectations of the practice group as a whole.  For example, the car-
diology practice group of a hospital may want to start with the CPGs 
promulgated by the American College of Cardiology (“ACC”).  The 
CPG working committee would then take the suggestions of the en-
tire practice group regarding modification of these CPGs to fit the 
collective practice style and professional judgments of all of the phy-
sicians in the practice group. 
Once the practice group adopts the first set of comprehensive 
guidelines, a CPG committee would be appointed on a yearly basis 
which would assume the responsibility for CPG review and updating.  
Whenever new CPG provisions or revisions of existing CPGs were dis-
tributed by the ACC (or other appropriate CPGs), the CPG commit-
tee would be responsible for making recommendations to the cardi-
ology practice group on the appropriateness of adoption, with or 
without revision, or rejection.  In addition, the cardiology CPG com-
mittee could modify these CPGs on an ongoing basis to keep pace 
with scientific developments over and above the CPGs suggested by 
the ACC.  The CPGs adopted by the cardiology practice group would 
then become the expectations of performance for all of the cardiol-
ogy practice group’s physicians.  These performance expectations 
would become part of the medical staff by-laws by virtue of an appen-
dix. 
For example, scientific studies have long established that provid-
ing aspirin to a patient within twenty-four hours of a heart attack may 
increase that patient’s chances of survival by thirty percent.281  Yet in 
hospitals across the country, physicians are failing to provide this 
simple life-saving treatment up to fifty percent of the time.282  Under 
this proposal, the CPG committees of all of the hospital cardiology 
departments across the country should propose that the CPG of the 
ACC283 recommending this treatment be adopted as an expectation of 
performance of the medical staff of the hospital’s cardiology depart-
ment. 
A legitimate criticism of this proposed process is the amount of 
time, duplication of effort and expense associated with this CPG re-
view enterprise.  A possible solution to these concerns is similar to 
 
 281 Hospital Quality Alliance Project, supra note 188. 
 282 Id. 
 283 The ACC/AHA Guidelines for the Management of Patients with Acute Myo-
cardial Infarction, and updates to the guidelines, are published in the Journal of the 
American College of Cardiology, 28 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1328–428 (1996); 34 J. AM. C. 
CARDIOLOGY 890–911 (1999) (updates), available at  http://content.onlinejacc.org/. 
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that which is used by the institutional review boards (“IRBs”) of medi-
cal institutions conducting multicenter trials during clinical investiga-
tions of drugs and devices.284 
[S]ometimes the IRB at each center of a multicenter trial con-
ducts a complete review of the protocol and informed consent.  
Such multiple reviews by multiple IRBs can result in unnecessary 
duplication of effort, delays, and increased expenses in the con-
duct of multicenter clinical trials.  Greater reliance on a central-
ized IRB review process, in appropriate circumstances, could re-
duce IRB burdens and delays in the conduct of multicenter 
trials.285 
For example, central IRBs have been created to review multicenter 
trials dealing with a particular type of condition.  “[T]he National 
Cancer Institute . . . has created a freestanding central IRB . . . to 
provide the option for centralized IRB review for the many multicen-
ter cancer trials conducted by NCI.”286  Similarly, CPG committees 
with comparable practice specialties could contract with a centralized 
CPG review group to perform a continuous review of CPGs to reflect 
scientific developments.  The recommendations of this centralized 
CPG group could then be submitted to the CPG committee of the lo-
cal institution for adoption, adoption with modification, or rejection.  
This pooling of resources is one way to deal with the concerns of du-
plication of effort, delay and expense. 
In choosing the appropriate CPGs, a CPG committee should ex-
amine two important questions.287  First, who developed the CPGs?  
And second, what methodologies were used?  Most probably, physi-
cians will be drawn to CPGs generated by those groups with ‘auspice 
legitimacy’;288 in other words, those developers with excellent reputa-
tions for accuracy and technical expertise.  These are most likely to 
be prestigious national groups representing practice specialties, such 
as the ACC or the American Heart Association.  On the other hand, 
physicians are likely to avoid those CPGs promulgated by payors, re-
ferred to by some as ‘boundary guidelines.’  Boundary guidelines “are 
 
 284 See U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry Using a Central-
ized IRB Review Process in Multicenter Clinical Trials, at Part II, http://www.fda. 
gov/cder/guidance/OC2005201fnl.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2006). 
 285 Id. (citations omitted). 
 286 Id. at Part VII.B. 
 287 These are adapted from the set of four questions that Professor Rosoff recom-
mends that a judge ask when deciding which CPGs should have evidentiary weight, 
and how much, in malpractice proceedings.  Rosoff, supra note 185, at 384–95. 
 288 Id. at 384 (citing Mehlman, supra note 268, at 377 (citing Kinney & Wilder, su-
pra note 266, at 448)). 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
2006] HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW 1247 
used by payors to define a range of practice options within which 
physicians could act without incurring financial or other sanctions.”289  
Based on altruistic motives, physicians are likely to perceive these 
types of CPGs as unduly limiting treatments necessary for patient wel-
fare based on cost/benefit decisions made by profit conscious pay-
ors.290  Physicians may also shun CPGs developed by payors based on 
self-protective motives.291  Payor-developed CPGs which call for the 
provision of less care may be viewed as increasing the risk of malprac-
tice exposure.292  As the literature documenting the practice of defen-
sive medicine demonstrates, the fear of liability greatly influences 
physician choices making these types of CPGs unlikely choices for 
adoption.293 
Next, a CPG committee should examine the scientific basis for 
the CPG carefully.  Was the clinical practice data base sufficiently 
large?  Were the results based on solid scientific outcomes research?  
Were the methodologies used appropriate and employed with the 
guidance of qualified medical professionals?  Is there provision for 
the timely updating of the CPG based on clinical experience with the 
CPG?  If the answers to any of these questions are negative, the CPG 
under consideration should be viewed with suspicion.  In contrast, 
CPGs which are created by competent scientists based on careful 
analysis of an appropriately large data base (controlling for con-
founding, bias and probability issues) created to optimize quality of 
care should be carefully considered for adoption.294 
3. Expectations of Performance 
Once the CPGs are adopted by the practice group, each physi-
cian who is a member of that department will be expected to comply 
with the CPGs except in situations where, in the judgment of the phy-
sician, they are not appropriate.  In those circumstances, the physi-
cian will be expected to engage in documentation of the reasons for 
deviating from the CPGs.  A physician who fails to comply with the 
 
 289 Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care, supra note 266, at 778 n.3 (citing 
L. LEWIN & J.E. ERIKSON, LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES: 
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS 3 (rev. ed. 1989) (prepared for 
the Physician Payment Review Commission’s Conference on Practice Guidelines, 
Washington, D.C., Oct. 11, 1988)). 
 290 See generally Rosoff, supra note 185, at 376 (generally describing some of the 
reasons for negative physician attitudes toward CPGs). 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
VAN TASSEL FINAL 5/30/2006  8:49:08 PM 
1248 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1179 
CPGs without a well-documented rationale should be subject to cor-
rective action.295 
For example, if a CPG on aspirin treatment of heart attack vic-
tims has been adopted and if a heart attack patient is admitted to the 
hospital with a condition that contradicts the provision of this treat-
ment, the physician must document this fact.  Otherwise, the failure 
to provide the treatment will violate the performance expectation as 
set forth in the adopted CPG. 
This documentation exception should avoid a rigid expectation 
that the CPG be followed in all circumstances.  It recognizes that pa-
tient care does not always follow the norm and allows for flexibility to 
adjust to a patient’s unique needs.296  As Professor Rosoff explains: 
 The goal of . . . CPGs is not, despite what some physicians may 
believe, to remove all elements of discretion and professional 
judgment from medical care.  There will always be the need—
and, one would hope, the latitude—for the exercise of profes-
sional judgment.  Still, as the body of what is knowable and what is 
known grows, the degree of latitude will inevitably be impacted by 
the extant knowledge base.  When one does not know what is 
right or wrong, everything is fair game to do.  Knowledge brings 
limitations, or at least, the basis for limitations to be imposed.  As 
an Institute of Medicine committee on Practice Guidelines has 
stated, the formal recognition of the practice guidelines move-
ment “can be seen as part of a significant cultural shift, a move 
away from unexamined reliance on professional judgment toward 
more structured support and accountability for such judgment.”297 
 
 295 If physician competence is questioned based on frequent deviations from the 
CPGs, the pattern of conduct should be evaluated in peer review by a reasonable care 
standard.  The CPG which was avoided, customary care standards, and evidence re-
garding the benefits and risks associated with the physician’s choices in the provision 
of patient care would all be relevant.  See infra Part VII.B.7 for a discussion of the 
appropriate reasonable care standard.  Instituting this system could provide earlier 
notice of a physician who exercises poor judgment on a continual basis.  Earlier no-
tice allows for earlier intervention in the form, for example, of required attendance 
at educational seminars.  Instituting corrective action before patient harm occurs 
enhances the quality of patient care.  In addition, earlier interventions may lead to 
less dire correctional measures.  The less dire the correctional measures, the more 
likely that the physician will accept these actions informally, avoiding the costs asso-
ciated with the formal peer review process. 
 296 Rosoff, supra note 185, at 375. 
 297 Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting INST. OF MED., supra note 264, at 2). 
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4. Enhancing the Quality of Patient Care 
While CPGs generally are still in their infancy, as evidence-based 
medicine moves forward,298 under this proposal, the CPGs of hospital 
departments can develop apace.  A benefit of introducing CPGs into 
the peer review process is that it requires physicians to keep step with 
current practice.  At the same time, the committee approach encour-
ages the practice group to make an educated rejection of a CPG 
rather than a rejection through inertia either from indifference or 
from the burdens of daily practice which leave little time for review-
ing, assessing, and integrating the almost constant flow of new scien-
tific developments.  Collectively shouldering this burden through this 
process protects an entire practice group from lagging behind new 
scientific developments.  Physicians will no longer be able to ignore 
new suggested CPGs out of hand, but will be required under the by-
laws to make informed decisions to accept, modify and accept, or re-
ject them. There is little doubt that the quality of patient care will 
benefit from this process. 
Applying contractual expectations of performance provisions 
also side steps doctrines inherent in customary care measurements 
and tort ‘standard of care’ analysis.  The locality rule,299 honest error 
rule300 and the good faith mistake rule,301 which can sometimes act to 
immunize an incompetent physician from corrective action, all be-
come irrelevant.  The concept of fault is properly eliminated from 
 
 298 “Medical knowledge about evidence-based medicine has accumulated at a 
staggering rate.  Between 1966 and 1995, the number of clinical research articles 
based on randomized clinical trials jumped from about 100 per year to 10,000 annu-
ally.”  FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 99, § 6-2, at 274 (citing Mark R. Chas-
sin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality?, 76 MILBANK QUARTERLY 565, 574 
(1998)).  “Web-based databases have proliferated to help physicians gain efficient 
and use-friendly access to this proliferation of guidelines and other medical informa-
tion.”  Id. (citing Barry R. Furrow, Broadcasting Clinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will 
Physicians Tune In?, 25 AM. J. LAW & MED. 403 (1999)): 
The National Guideline Clearinghouse [http://www.guideline.gov] of-
fers free access by physicians and others to the current clinical practice 
guidelines . . . . A search produces all guidelines on a given subject, 
along with an appropriateness analysis of each guideline.  The Clear-
inghouse provides a standardized abstract of each guideline, and 
grades the scientific basis for its recommendations and the develop-
ment process for each. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Other commercial internet-based services include MDCon-
sult, http://www.mdconsult.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2006), and Medscape, http:// 
www.medscape.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2006).  See FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW, su-
pra note 99, at 275. 
 299 See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text. 
 300 See supra note 260. 
 301 See supra note 260. 
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the process.  In addition, hospitals will not be barred from choosing 
to employ physicians who adopt ‘best practices’ instead of those who 
are minimally competent. 
5. Decreasing Transaction Costs While Still Enhancing 
Quality of Care 
Finally, with regard to the scope of discovery, little room remains 
for an argument that the care provided by other physicians in the de-
partment is relevant.  This means that discovery can be confined to 
the patient records of the allegedly incompetent physician.  This 
streamlines the process and makes the hospital less reluctant to act 
on evidence of incompetence on the part of a physician.  Hospitals 
may be willing to formally intervene with a recalcitrant physician 
much sooner as evidence comes to light of issues of incompetence, 
instead of waiting until the evidence becomes incontrovertible, the 
situation becomes dire and the only choice becomes termination of 
staff privileges.  This benefits the physician as intervention earlier 
rather than later may mean that the sanctions imposed will be less se-
vere than termination, allowing the physician the opportunity to 
remedy the situation.  The less dire the sanctions, the more willing 
the physician may be to accept them without triggering the costly 
formal peer review process.  Earlier intervention also inures to the 
benefit of patient safety as hospitals are more likely to intervene and 
take corrective actions to deal with incompetent physicians before a 
patient has actually suffered harm. 
6. Physician Due Process and Immunity Concerns 
Physicians may be motivated by self-interest to support adoption 
of CPGs to decrease uncertainty regarding the conduct that will trig-
ger formal peer review proceedings and the resultant notice to the 
National Practice Data Bank.  Adopting CPGs as the expectation of 
performance provides more adequate notice of the type of conduct 
which will subject the physician to corrective action.  The physician 
can then avoid this conduct.  It also provides the physician with a bet-
ter ability to prepare for a challenge to the suggested corrective ac-
tion.  As a result, HCQIA immunity is more likely to be bestowed on 
those who participate in the process. 
7. Including the Tort ‘Reasonable Care’ Standard as a 
Stop-Gap Measure 
As stated earlier, while growing at a staggering rate, medical 
knowledge grounded in evidence-based medicine is still in its infancy.  
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Thus, using CPGs created from evidence-based medicine will not 
provide an immediate solution for all situations involving allegedly 
incompetent physicians.  When CPGs with auspice authenticity have 
yet to be promulgated, relying on the standard of reasonable care as 
defined by negligence law can provide a workable stop-gap measure.  
This reasonable care standard must be divorced from most, if not all, 
of the other doctrinal trappings of medical malpractice jurisprudence 
for the reasons outlined earlier.302  In adopting this measure, medical 
staff by-laws should comport with the growing number of states which 
have rejected the use of customary care as conclusive evidence of the 
quality of patient care.303  Among other reasons, these states have 
found that such rigid application of custom can both insulate a physi-
cian whose practice has lagged behind scientific advancements or sti-
fle a physician from engaging in reasonable innovation to meet the 
needs of his or her patients.  Instead, custom should be used as some 
evidence of what constitutes reasonable care, along with other rele-
vant evidence of the risks and benefits associated with the patient 
care choices of the physician. 
8. Use of CPGs in Malpractice Litigation Post Adoption by 
the Medical Staff 
To date, courts have allowed CPGs to be used both defensively 
and offensively by both plaintiffs and physicians as evidence of the 
standard of care in medical malpractice actions.304  This use has 
drawn a great deal of support and criticism.  Many of the criticisms of 
this use are met if the CPGs relied upon by the courts are first 
adopted by the medical staff by-laws. 
 
 302 See supra notes 256–60 and accompanying text. 
 303 Peters, supra note 205, at 913–16. 
 304 See, e.g., Basten v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 962, 967 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (use of 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists guidelines relating to screening 
procedures for medical condition); Green v. Goldberg, 630 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (expert testimony supported by American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists bulletin dealing with breast cancer treatment); Miles v. Ta-
bor, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (Mass. 1982) (violation of the American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists guidelines to fail to resuscitate an infant immediately 
post-delivery); Roper v. Blumenfeld, 706 A.2d 1151, 1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 
1998) (plaintiff’s use of 1992 Parameters of Care for Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery: A 
Guide to Practice, Monitoring and Evaluation to establish breach of standard of care); 
Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C., No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL 536949, 
at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997) (use of Exercise Test Parameters Associated 
with Poor Prognosis and/or Increased Severity of CAD [Coronary Artery Disease] 
contained in a brochure produced by the American College of Cardiology and the 
American Heart Association as standard of care). 
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Historically, the scope of the evidentiary use of CPGs was vested 
in the hands of the courts.  Except for some recent legislative initia-
tives discussed below, courts generally have the discretion to give CPG 
evidence a whole range of weights in establishing the standard of 
care, from no value, to highly or conclusive probative value.  Thus, 
CPGs currently serve the same function as expert testimony, just to 
different degrees in different courts.305 
Advocates of this use of CPGs in malpractice litigation point out 
that CPGs are far more specific than vague tort standards, may lower 
litigation costs by simplifying trials, make trial outcomes more pre-
dictable facilitating settlements, and may decrease uncertainty with 
regard to the legal system’s expectations, thereby lowering the cost of 
defensive medicine.306  In addition, CPGs would ameliorate com-
plaints with regard to the quality of expert testimony involving scien-
tific issues.307  In light of these possible benefits, some commentators 
have gone so far as to advocate that CPGs be given judicial notice as 
conclusive evidence of the standard of care.308  This proposal is prob-
lematic.  The American Medical Association explains that the medical 
profession as a whole is far from recognizing any one set of CPGs that 
is controlling.309  Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence explains 
 
 305 In reaching a decision on what weight, if any, a CPG should be given, a court 
may consider its auspice.  Mehlman, supra note 268, at 377 (taking the position that 
CPGs promulgated by nationally recognized groups should be the only judicially-
recognized CPGs); Rosoff, supra note 185, at 379.  The greatest amount of weight 
would likely be given to CPGs issued by the federal AHCPR, followed by those issued 
by well-regarded professional bodies such as the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology.  Mehlman, supra note 268, at 377; see also Kinney, supra note 25, at 448.  
Those issued by an HMO are likely to carry the least weight.  Mehlman, supra note 
268, at 377. 
 306 Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 96; see also 
Brennan, Practice Guidelines, supra note 269, at 67–68; Mark Hall, The Defensive Effect of 
Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, 
at 119, 119. 
 307 Brennan, Practice Guidelines, supra note 269, at 74 (practice guidelines in health 
policy); see generally also Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Pro-
posals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in 
Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1989); Jack Weinstein, Litigation and Statis-
tics, 3 STAT. SCI. 289 (1988); Milton R. Wessel, Adversary Science and the Adversary Scien-
tist: Threats to Responsible Dispute Resolution, 28 JURIMETRICS 379, 380–81 (1988) (detail-
ing societal disillusionment with the “battle of the experts”). 
 308 Leahy, supra note 265, at 1506–08 (advocating for judicial notice of CPGs as 
evidence of the legal standard of care); see generally Mehlman, supra note 268, at 378 
(arguing that a presumption should be created that CPGs issued by reputable medi-
cal organizations are evidence of national standards). 
 309 For a detailed explanation of the problems associated with the use of CPGs in 
malpractice litigation, see Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 674 & n.130 
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that judicial notice is inappropriate when the fact at issue is “‘subject 
to reasonable dispute’” as it is not established by either common 
knowledge or “‘sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably ques-
tioned.’”310  The number of CPGs, over 1600,311 creates a formidable 
task for a judge who attempts to make a determination of which CPG 
should be blessed by judicial notice.  A judge is unlikely to have the 
necessary expertise to make this choice.312 
However, when the physicians in a hospital practice have, as a 
group, identified the CPGs which will govern their practice, it pro-
vides greater guidance to judges in deciding as an evidentiary matter 
what CPGs are relevant to defining the standard of care if one of the 
members of that practice is sued.  Physicians have the medical knowl-
edge needed to accurately assess the risks, benefits and burdens in-
volved with different CPGs.  Patients already rely on physicians to en-
gage in exactly this kind of decision-making that will maximize 
patient outcomes.  Judicial acknowledgment of the physician choices 
of CPGs may lower the cost of litigating this issue.  If this comes to 
pass, the extent of defensive medicine may be driven down as the 
physician is provided with some degree of certainty313 with regard to 
what will be deemed to be ‘appropriate care’ by the tort system.314 
 
(2001) (citing Ed Hirshfeld, Use of Practice Parameters as Standards of Care and in Health 
Care Reform: A View from the American Medical Association, 19 JOINT COMM’N J. ON 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 322, 323 (1993) (explaining that CPGs only use should be as 
evidence of the standard of care)). 
 310 Id. at 674 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201(b)). 
 311 Id. 
 312 It is true that CPGs can first be fairly easily categorized (as described above) 
based on the entity which promulgated them.  Then, choosing the most favored aus-
pice category should also be relatively easy.  However, finally choosing which CPG 
from the auspice category of choice which is appropriate to the clinical situation is a 
commission best undertaken by an individual with medical training and experience.  
A judge is unlikely to have the necessary expertise. 
 313 Hall & Green, supra note 183, at 669 (“Much of the concern about costs cre-
ated by ‘defensive medicine’ (physicians incurring unnecessary costs and risks simply 
to avoid suit) would be mitigated if physicians had stronger assurance they will be 
held only to standards that reflect genuinely prevailing professional practices and 
opinions.”). 
 314 Id.  In addition, 
[m]edical drug and device companies regularly use the fear of liability 
to motivate physicians to adopt new, expensive technologies, some-
times prematurely or excessively, by arguing that physicians could be 
held accountable for not quickly adopting a “state of the art” innova-
tion.  If physicians knew that they could document pockets of skepti-
cism about these profit-motivated claims, they could more safely resist 
inappropriate expansions of new technologies whose risks and benefits 
are not yet thoroughly understood or whose costs may be excessive. 
Id. 
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Some tort reformers advocate carving out a greater role for 
CPGs in malpractice litigation by legislative initiatives.315  Other types 
of suggested legislative initiatives include obligating physicians and 
patients to agree to be contractually bound by a set of CPGs which 
would define the standard of care or requiring that courts take judi-
cial notice of CPGs as conclusive evidence of the standard of care.316  
However, CPGs as conclusive evidence of the standard of care is prob-
 
 315 Id. (pointing out that several states have listened to this advice).  For example, 
Kentucky passed the following legislation allowing the use of CPGs by physicians to 
establish an affirmative defense to malpractice: 
Any provider of medical services under this chapter who has followed 
the practice parameters or guidelines developed or adopted pursuant 
to this subsection shall be presumed to have met the appropriate legal 
standard of care in medical malpractice cases regardless of any unan-
ticipated complication that may thereafter develop or be discovered. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.035(8)(b) (West 2005).  Both Maine and Minnesota passed 
legislative initiatives.  The Maine legislation provided physicians with immunity from 
suit if the physician acted in compliance with approved CPGs.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24, § 2972(1) (Supp. 1994).  This legislation was repealed in 1999.  1999 Me. Laws 
c.668, s.104.  The Minnesota version provided an absolute defense for physicians who 
complied with approved CPGs.  MINN. STAT. § 62J.34(3)(a) (1994).  This was also re-
pealed in 1995.  1995 Minn. Laws c. 234, art.5, s.24.  Mello, supra note 309, at 707. 
 316 Mello, supra note 309, at 693–94.  Those who advocate for the contractual 
model argue that consumers will be enfranchised by their ability to choose between 
physicians based on the quality of care provided as set forth in the different CPGs 
adopted.  See, e.g., Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 182, at 
113.  However, this consumer choice opportunity is a partially empty one based on 
“imperfect information, imperfect rationality and imperfect freedom of choice.”  
Mello, supra note 309, at 669.  Consumers do not have the medical knowledge 
needed to accurately assess the risks and benefits involved with different CPGs.  Add-
ing to this information disconnect are studies that suggest that consumers do not 
necessarily make decisions based on objective considerations that would lead to a 
maximization of long-term benefits.  Id. (citing Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the 
Health System We Want, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 383, 404–11 (1997) (challeng-
ing the utilization of consumer choice theory in the health care market)).  Subjective 
concerns that have little to do with rational choices can lead a consumer’s decision-
making away from optimizing the potential for positive outcomes.  Id. at 670 & n.114 
(explaining that some consumers fail to take advantage of plans that provide better 
coverage simply out of a reluctance to make change) (citing Daniel Kahneman, New 
Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 
18 (1994) (“[P]eople are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting their 
future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect 
evaluation of past experiences.”) (alteration in original)). Moreover, the idea that a 
consumer has freedom to choose among practitioners ignores the reality that those 
with employer provided insurance have either a limited number of choices among 
health plans, perhaps two or three at the most, or no choice at all.  Id. at 670–71.  Of 
those employees who do have a choice on paper, the reality is that the only real op-
tion is the lower cost plan as a result of budgetary concerns.  It is the plan that dic-
tates which physicians the individual can use. 
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lematic regardless of the mechanism of their imposition.317  Such 
rigid rules could insulate a physician whose practice group has lagged 
behind scientific advancements in updating their CPGs.  These rigid 
rules could also stifle a physician from exercising the option to devi-
ate from the practice group’s CPGs in order to engage in reasonable 
innovation to meet the needs of his or her patients.  The better rule 
would be to call for judicial notice of the use of CPGs adopted by 
practice groups as some evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of the 
standard of care. 
A final criticism is that some CPGs espouse optimal care rather 
than reasonable care.318  The argument is that this standard eschews 
the basic premise that tort liability be based on fault as defined by ei-
ther failure to adhere to socially acceptable conduct (custom), or at 
the most, a violation of reasonable care.  No other type of profes-
sional is held to a standard of optimal care under tort law.  Further-
more, if the law proceeds to hold a physician to an optimal standard 
of care, malpractice insurance premiums may skyrocket. 
However, if the physician has agreed to provide a certain level of 
care by agreeing to the adoption of the CPG in the first place, the 
question of fairness to the physician becomes irrelevant.  In addition, 
those hospital departments that do adopt CPGs as a part of their ex-
pectations for performance may be able to negotiate lower malprac-
tice insurance rates for all members of the department.  The depart-
ment may also be in a stronger position to draw a line in the sand 
with reimbursement insurers which are striving to impose limits on 
the provision of care that are antithetical to the quality of care pro-
vided by the department. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Using vague ‘standard of care’ measures of clinical competence 
in the formal peer review process brings a whole bag of rules and 
premises, both legal and evidentiary, that unduly confuse, burden, 
and jeopardize the validity of the peer review process.  Applying these 
vague and ambiguous  ‘standard of care’ rules ex post facto creates 
an arguably unfair process of review for physicians and places all of 
the participants in the process at risk of losing HCQIA immunity.  Ul-
timately, the hospital may be unduly reluctant to initiate such a bur-
 
 317 See generally Ayres, supra note 268, at 436–38; Hall & Green, supra note 183, at 
663; Andrew L. Hyams, David Shapiro & Troyen Brennan, Medical Practice Guidelines 
in Malpractice Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 289 
(1996); INST. OF MED., supra note 264, at 8; Rosoff, supra note 185. 
 318 Hall & Green, supra note 183, at 665. 
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densome and expensive process, placing patient safety at risk.  Re-
placing vague ‘standard of care’ language with express contractual 
terminology, such as ‘expectations of performance,’ and incorporat-
ing specifically chosen and uniquely tailored Clinical Practice Guide-
lines (“CPGs”) directly into the medical staff by-laws, may result in a 
more equitable balancing of the public’s quality of care concerns with 
the interests of the physician in a fair process of review of adverse 
formal peer review actions.  In addition, this shift to contract princi-
ples could streamline the formal peer review process making a hospi-
tal less reluctant to engage in peer review, and allowing peer review 
to live up to its promise as an effective system of accountability for the 
enhancement of patient care. 
 
